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INTERAGENCY COORDINATION ON 
LABOR REGULATION 
HIBA HAFIZ* 
After 9/11, Congress, federal agencies, and scholars exposed the devastating results of 
the national security agencies’ failure to coordinate.  The financial crisis has been linked to 
similar coordination failures in the context of interagency banking regulation, with 
jurisdictional gaps and blind spots resulting in failure to prevent a global recession.  But 
despite Gilded Age-levels of inequality, little attention has focused on the failures of 
interagency coordination to secure Americans’ access to economic opportunity through 
work—whether through securing higher wages and higher union density, coordinating 
government enforcement to achieve redistributive goals and combat consolidation of employer 
buyer power, or overcoming systemic abuses in employers’ wage theft, discrimination, and 
worker mistreatment.  The crippling spread of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic 
demands that now, more than ever, agencies coordinate in their regulation of labor markets 
to accomplish micro– and macroeconomic policy goals. 
 
This Essay is a component of a larger project that seeks to document federal agencies’ 
selective coordination along six core policy vectors that impact work- or income-based 
avenues towards equality—macroeconomic, microeconomic, institution-building, industry-
specific, anti-subordination, and democratic/expressive policy.  It presents the results of a 
novel data set collecting and systematizing existing Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) 
authorized by the core agencies involved in labor market regulation: the Department of Labor 
(DOL), its sub-agencies, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the Department of Justice-Antitrust 
Division, and the Federal Trade Commission.  By hand-coding and analyzing the 112 
discoverable MOUs from the 1950s to the present, the Essay presents a novel history of 
interagency coordination on labor regulation, highlighting which labor agencies coordinate 
most and least, what such coordination facilitates as a substantive and administrative 
 
* Hiba Hafiz is an Assistant Professor of Law at Boston College Law School; Affiliate 
Fellow, Thurman Arnold Project, Yale School of Management. The author is deeply grateful 
for comments and feedback from Atinuke Adediran, Daniel Farbman, Michael Green, 
Claudia Haupt, Steven Koh, Blaine Saito, and participants in the Boston-Area Junior Faculty 
Roundtable and Texas A&M University School of Law “Administrative Law and the 
Workplace Impact” conference. 
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matter, and the broad scope and areas of labor market regulation on which coordination has 
not yet occurred.  It concludes by arguing that the federal government lacks a coherent, aligned 
vision on labor market regulation and economic mobility through work, and proposes next 
steps for improving agency coordination. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The COVID-19 pandemic has presented an unprecedented crisis for our 
nation’s labor markets.  American workers have faced furloughs, layoffs, and 
levels of unemployment unseen since unemployment data has been collected,1 
unprecedented levels of workplace health and safety risk,2 and a broken social 
safety net.3  The pandemic recession has hit at a time of growing economic 
inequality associated with a decline in labor’s share of national income.  At the 
 
1. GENE FALK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46554, UNEMPLOYMENT RATES DURING THE 
COVID-19 PANDEMIC (2021), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R46554.pdf. 
2. Emily Schwing, How OSHA Has Failed to Protect America’s Workers from COVID-19, 
REVEAL (Apr. 4, 2020), https://revealnews.org/article/how-osha-has-failed-to-protect-
americas-workers-from-covid-19/. 
3. See, e.g., Henry Aaron, The Social Safety Net: The Gaps That COVID-19 Highlights, 
BROOKINGS INST. (June 23, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/06/23
/the-social-safety-net-the-gaps-that-covid-19-spotlights; Hiba Hafiz et al., Regulating in Pandemic: 
Evaluating Economic and Financial Policy Responses to the Coronavirus Crisis (B.C. L. Sch., Working Paper 
No. 527, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3555980. 
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same time, vanishingly weak labor market institutions in the public and private 
sector have failed to protect against these devastating impacts on workers’ lives.4  
And low union density with limited worker representation outside of unions has 
eroded any countervailing leverage workers can assert on their own.5  
Combined, these realities have put even more pressure on the government to 
create robust enforcement networks and safety nets to guarantee workplace—
and workplace-generated protections and benefits for those most in need. 
But despite the unparalleled need for wide-ranging, coherent agency 
coordination to meet these challenges, our current labor market 
regulation is thoroughly fragmented.6  Agencies and sub-agencies tasked 
with ensuring the availability of well-paying, non-discriminatory, safe jobs 
that can serve as sources of sustained economic opportunity and 
mobility—the Department of Labor (DOL) and its sub-agencies, the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the Department of Justice (DOJ)’s 
Antitrust Division, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the 
Treasury Department, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the 
Federal Reserve—have over– and underlapping jurisdiction, competing 
policy goals, limited information-sharing and access to common data, and 
 
4. See, e.g., ANTHONY ATKINSON, INEQUALITY: WHAT CAN BE DONE? 133–54 (2015); 
THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 307–15 (2014); Anna Stansbury & 
Lawrence Summers, The Declining Worker Power Hypothesis (Nat’l. Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working 
Paper No. 27193, 2020), https://www.nber.org/papers/w27193; David Autor et al., Concentrating 
on the Fall of Labor Share, 107 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROC. 180 (2017), https:/
/doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20171102; Reuven Avi-Yonah & Orli Avi-Yonah, Be Careful What You Wish 
For? Reducing Inequality in the 21st Century, (Unv. of Mich. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 17-002, 
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2958401 (2017); Emmanuel Saez, 
Income and Wealth Inequality: Evidence and Policy Implications, 35 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 7 (2017); Mike 
Elsby et al., The Decline of the U.S. Labor Share, Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity, Fall 2013. 
5. BUREAU OF LAB. STATISTICS, UNION MEMBERS SUMMARY, U.S. DEP’T LAB. (Jan. 22, 
2021, 10:00 AM), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm (reporting 6.3 percent 
unionization rate in the private sector and 10.8 percent of the labor force overall); Kate 
Andrias & Benjamin Sachs, Constructing Countervailing Power: Law and Organizing in an Era of 
Political Inequality, 130 YALE L.J. 546 (Jan.2021). 
6. For fragmentary and limited interagency coordination, see, e.g., MICHAEL PIORE & 
ANDREW SCHRANK, ROOT-CAUSE REGULATION 1–40 (2018); SHANNON GLEESON, 
PRECARIOUS CLAIMS: THE PROMISE AND FAILURE OF WORKPLACE PROTECTIONS 132–33 
(2016); SHANNON GLEESON, CONFLICTING COMMITMENTS 57–59 (2012); Michael Oswalt & 
César Rosado Marzán, Organizing the State: The New “Labor Law” Seen from the Bottom Up, 39 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 415, 430–32 (2018); Matthew Amengual & Janice Fine, Co-
Enforcing Labor Standards, 11 REGUL. & GOVERNANCE 129, 129–30 (2017).  
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limited coordination mechanisms to prioritize strategic enforcement.7 
Slowing the collapse of our nation’s labor markets and planning a jobs-led 
economic recovery will require robust interagency coordination.  This Essay 
is a component of a larger project that seeks to document and analyze the 
scope and limitations of administrative agency regulation of labor markets.  
Much like criminal law scholars have worked to map the broader network of 
the criminal justice system—from police stops to the after-effects of 
incarceration—the project seeks to think systematically about Government 
regulation of labor markets—or lack thereof—as constituting a labor justice 
system that can also work to preserve certain societal structures and 
distributions, and limit access to economic mobility and opportunity.  This 
system is not limited to agencies traditionally associated with labor market 
regulation—the DOL, NLRB, and EEOC—but also includes the antitrust 
agencies that regulate employer buyer power in labor markets, the Treasury 
Department, IRS, and the Federal Reserve that create and enforce rules that 
incentivize or shape employment opportunities.  
This Essay presents a novel data set collecting existing Memoranda of 
Understanding (MOUs) authorized by the core agencies involved in labor 
market regulation: DOL, its sub-agencies, the NLRB, the EEOC, DOJ’s 
Antitrust Division, the FTC, the Treasury Department, the IRS, and the 
Federal Reserve.  MOUs are generally unenforceable, non-binding agreements 
signed between agencies and sub-agencies that clarify agencies’ respective 
jurisdiction, assign regulatory tasks, and establish ground rules for information-
sharing, investigation, enforcement, and other informal arrangements.8  They 
function as the network of contracts that stitch together interagency 
coordination within the administrative state.  By reviewing and hand-coding 
the 112 discoverable MOUs between these agencies from the 1950s to the 
present, the Essay presents the first history of interagency coordination on 
labor regulation, highlighting which labor agencies coordinate most and least, 
best practices of interagency coordination through MOUs, and the broad 
scope and areas of labor market regulation on which coordination has not yet 
occurred.  It contributes to a broader literature in administrative law that has 
 
7. For strategic enforcement, see, e.g., DAVID WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS 
THROUGH STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT (2010), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/WH
D/legacy/files/strategicEnforcement.pdf; JANICE FINE ET AL., MAINTAINING EFFECTIVE U.S. 
LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT THROUGH THE CORONAVIRUS RECESSION, WASH. CTR. 
EQUITABLE GROWTH (Sept. 2020), https://equitablegrowth.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/
09/090320-labor-enforcement-report.pdf.  
8. See generally Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1161–65 (2012). 
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focused on interagency coordination starting in the mid-2000s.9  While labor 
scholars have recently begun to contribute to this literature by analyzing 
interagency coordination on labor policy at the local level,10 this Essay is the first 
to address interagency coordination on labor regulation at the federal level. 
The Essay proceeds in three parts.  Part I describes and contextualizes the 
original data set of collected MOUs. Part II analyzes their characteristics based 
on 22 hand-coded categories identifying their core traits and functions.  It then 
extracts from that data best practices for interagency coordination and exposes 
areas of fragmentary and underlapping jurisdiction in need of remedy.  Finally, 
Part III proposes next steps for outcome-based interagency coordination based 
on a consolidated metric of six core policy vectors derived from labor and 
employment law’s stated statutory purposes and scholarly commentary on 
optimal labor market regulation and worker protections. Based on those 
vectors, it suggests fruitful avenues for future coordination on policymaking 
and enforcement actions to ensure robust labor market regulation and growth. 
I. INTERAGENCY LABOR REGULATION THROUGH MEMORANDA OF 
UNDERSTANDING (MOUS) 
This Part presents the results of a novel data set of 112 publicly-available 
MOUs, dating from 1970 to the present, signed by the agencies and sub-
agencies that regulate labor and labor markets: the DOL, NLRB, EEOC, DOJ-
Antitrust Division, FTC, Treasury Department, IRS, and the Federal Reserve.  
The MOUs were collected from agency websites and the Federal Register.11  No 
scholar or commentator has systematically catalogued or analyzed these MOUs 
despite their decades-long use as coordinating mechanisms by core agencies 
regulating labor markets.  Because agencies tasked with regulating labor market 
conditions rarely engage in joint rulemakings or joint adjudication, and are 
 
9. See generally Verity Winship, Enforcement Networks, 37 YALE J. REG. 274 (2020); Bijal 
Shah, Congress’s Agency Coordination, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1961 (2019); Daniel Farber & Anne 
Joseph O’Connell, Agencies as Adversaries, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1375 (2017); Gillian Metzger & 
Kevin Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1239 (2017); Bijal Shah, Uncovering 
Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, 128 HARV. L. REV. 805 (2015); Jason Marisam, Interagency 
Administration, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183 (2013); Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8; Keith Bradley, The 
Design of Agency Interactions, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 745 (2011); Jason Marisam, Duplicative 
Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181 (2011); Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart 
Intelligence, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1655 (2006); Jacob Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction 
in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201 (2006); see also FREDERICK KAISER, CONG. 
RSCH. SERV., R41803, INTERAGENCY COLLABORATIVE ARRANGEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES 
(2011), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41803.pdf. 
10. See Oswalt & Marzán, supra note 6. 
11. For data collection methods, see infra Part I.B. 
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rarely directly tasked by Congress to engage in coordination, their primary 
means of coordinating policy and enforcement priorities are through 
memoranda of understanding (MOUs) and other informal mechanisms.12  
While MOUs are non-binding and function only as on-paper commitments, 
they offer an unprecedented window into how agencies have articulated their 
obligations to one another over time and are informative about what labor 
market data and information each of the agencies collect, share, and analyze 
with other agencies to tailor their regulation and enforcement priorities.  The 
Part first provides an overview of interagency coordination through MOUs.  It 
then describes the author’s data set collection methods, what the data reveal 
about the history of interagency networks built through MOUs between 
agencies regulating workers and labor markets and concludes by summarizing 
the purposes and functions those MOUs have served.  
A. Interagency Coordination Through MOUs 
The vision of an administrative state with individual agencies 
 
12. Agencies generally rarely engage in joint rulemaking—the National Archives and 
Records Administration estimated that 3.9% of total annual rules in 2010 were joint rules.  See 
Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1167 & n. 167.  But agencies can and have coordinated on 
rulemakings outside the joint rulemaking context in areas of overlapping jurisdiction and often 
comment on other agencies’ proposed rules through the public comment process or through 
the OMB review process.  See, e.g., Shah, Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, supra note 
9, at 826; Todd Aagaard, Regulatory Overlap, Overlapping Legal Fields, and Statutory Discontinuities, 
29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 237 (2011) (describing EPA and OSHA coordination on rulemakings).  
For the limited interagency adjudication between labor agencies, see Shah, Coordinated 
Interagency Adjudication, supra note 9, at 884–94, 900–05 (listing eleven narrow areas of inter- 
and intra-agency coordination between: OSHA and OSHRC; DOL and DHS; EEOC and 
DOL-OFCCP; OSHA and EPA; DOL and the DOJ Parole Commission; DOL and the 
Department of Veterans Affairs; DOL and DHHS, DOJ and DOE; DOL and DOD; EEOC 
and FCC; DOL-OFCCP and EEOC; and DOL and the Treasury Department).  Of these, 
three were mandated by statute, three were implemented through regulations, and the rest 
were coordinated through MOUs.  For example, in the collaboration between DOL and 
DHS, under 9 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(1) (2012), Congress delegated to DHS the power to 
“consult[] with the appropriate agencies of the Government” in deciding whether to grant 
a foreign worker an H-2B visa, and based on that authority, DHS adjudicates visa eligibility 
and can deny H-2B visas through a final determination on visa petitions but transfers 
authority to DOL to make final determinations on H-2B visa petitions.  But see G.H. Daniels 
v. Perez, 626 Fed. Appx. 205 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding that transfer of decision-making 
authority from DHS to DOL was “impermissible subdelegation of authority”); Bijal Shah, 
Interagency Transfers of Adjudication Authority, 34 YALE J. REG. 279, 291–93 (2017).  For the very 
limited congressionally-mandated interagency coordination on work law, see Shah, Congress’s 
Agency Coordination, supra note 9, at 2016, 2062, 2067, 2086, 2090 & accompanying notes. 
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autonomously acting under the delegated authority of organic statutes—a 
vision codified in the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 and canonical 
judicial decisions—is something of a “lost world of administrative law.”13  
Scholars now understand the administrative state as a network of agencies 
transected with overlapping and underlapping jurisdiction, with a range of 
dependencies on one another to successfully achieve presidential and 
congressional policy objectives, shot through with under- and 
overdetermined Executive and congressional oversight, and with agency 
personnel susceptible to more and less internal drift due to political and 
private regulatory goals.14   Agencies can compete and coordinate through 
a range of formal and informal mechanisms, ranging from statutorily-
mandated collaborations and top-down Executive Order or 
administrative directives from the President to “bottom up” informal 
collaborative arrangements driven by agency leadership, field agents, or 
even private co-enforcers such as advocacy groups or regulated parties.15 
Researching and analyzing this web of interagency and intraagency 
coordination is critical for understanding how the administrative state 
does and ought to work.  Optimal interagency coordination can reduce 
policy fragmentation, mitigate wasteful competition among agencies, 
enhance efficiency and effectiveness, change organizational and 
administrative cultures, and streamline and improve congressional and 
executive oversight.16  It can also prompt agencies to focus scarce 
resources on high-priority targets and produce “policy-relevant 
information” for other agencies, Congress, and the broader public.17  
 
13. See Daniel Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 
92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1141–54 (2014). 
14. See generally supra note 9 (providing examples of interagency cooperation).  See also 
Jennifer Nou, Civil Servant Disobedience, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 349 (2019); Jennifer Nou, 
Subdelegating Powers, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 473 (2017); Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, 
129 HARV. L. REV. 422 (2015); Kirti Datla & Richard Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies 
(and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769 (2013). 
15. See, e.g., KAISER, supra note 9, at 1 (highlighting interagency cooperation is “called 
for in public laws, executive orders, and administrative directives . . . .”); Oswalt & 
Marzán, supra note 6, at 432–40 (discussing the various ways that federal agencies 
cooperate on various levels); Bradley, supra note 9, at 748. 
16. KAISER, supra note 9, at 14–20; Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1139–43 (arguing that 
delegating authority to more than one agency is a more effective way to achieve lawmakers 
intended goals); see also Matthew McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight 
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984) (analogizing how 
the current system of Congressional oversight operates like police patrol and fire-alarms). 
17. Matthew Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 
1422, 1463 (2011). 
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Coordination can reduce private transaction costs where agencies can 
harmonize inconsistent regulatory approaches or simplify and integrate 
jurisdictional assignments, creating greater certainty for regulated 
parties.18  But interagency coordination can also distract from an agency’s 
core responsibilities and priorities, burden agencies with coordination 
and decision costs, and decrease transparency to the extent it makes 
individual agency responsibility more obscure and informal collaborative 
relationships less legible to regulated parties and the public.19 
Whether coordination is beneficial or detrimental turns in large part on 
the procedures and substantive outcomes specified and monitored through 
interagency instruments of coordination.  The most common and pervasive 
coordination instruments agencies use are memoranda of understanding, or 
MOUs.20  MOUs are primarily used to “assign[] responsibility for specific 
tasks, establish[] procedures, and bind[] agencies to fulfill mutual 
commitments.”21  While they are informal instruments, they cite legal 
authority for their terms and offer rationales for how they further agencies’ 
mandates under their respective organic statutes and jurisdiction as well as 
the agencies’ respective enforcement goals.22  
MOUs can function as a medium for coordinating substantive policy 
and enforcement while also working to reduce transaction costs between 
agencies and for regulated parties.  They establish ex ante rules for agency 
interactions and formulate how the agencies will interface, “converting a 
sequential decisionmaking process into an integrated one with a single 
record.”23  By ironing out jurisdictional conflicts, establishing points of 
 
18. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1183. 
19. See, e.g., KAISER, supra note 9, at 21–23; Oswalt & Marzán, supra note 6, at 430–431 
(discussing how these overlaps and inconsistencies in agency overlapping has negatively affected 
workers rights); Bradley, supra note 9, at 749; Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1187–91. 
20. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1161–65 (providing examples of agency MOU use 
to establish jurisdictional lines and procedures for information-sharing, collaborate on common 
missions, coordinate reviews or approvals in contexts of joint authority, and agree on substantive 
policy).  Agencies sometimes refer to these as “memoranda of agreement”.  See infra Appendix A. 
21. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1161. 
22. Interagency MOUs trace the legal authority for their respective agencies’ 
coordination to congressional statutes, Executive Orders, and agency regulations in their 
“Purpose” or “Legal Authorities” sections.  See infra Appendix A.  For congressional 
authorization of interagency coordination by labor agencies under various congressional 
statutes, see Shah, Congress’s Agency Coordination, supra note 9, at notes 100, 263, 510, 603, 629 
and accompanying text (collecting sources). 
23. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1164–65, 1184–85 (demonstrating how 
integration of decisionmaking can help agencies act more efficiently). For ex ante and ex post 
controls over agency actions, see Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 
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contact and information-sharing mechanisms, designing avenues for joint 
investigations, joint enforcement, and joint policy-making, MOUs establish 
procedures and pathways for efficient co-functioning and allow agencies to 
“improve the expertise on which their decisions are based.”24  Not only 
that, MOUs can encourage agencies to compete and be “laboratories” for 
policy ideas through a structured process that requires them to account to 
each other.25  And MOUs can be used to signal changes in enforcement 
policy without statutory change, so long as their policy-setting is consistent 
with statutory and budgetary requirements.26 
While MOUs have value in their “informality, ease of enactment, and 
adaptability,”27 the informality of MOUs also means that they cannot 
enforce themselves nor are they legally enforceable by others.  Their main 
value is in their ability to create buy-in on the part of agencies and agency 
personnel to cooperate with one another.28 And if that buy-in lapses, 
MOUs can serve as a touchstone instrument for Congress or the Executive 
to encourage revived agency coordination.29  
 
126 HARV. L. REV. 1755, 1766–67 (2013). 
24. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1165, 1184–85.  However, by establishing 
jurisdictional priorities, MOUs can also “shut down important voices in agency decision 
making” by granting one agency over another sole responsibility for regulating with limited 
advice from the other. Farber & O’Connell, supra note 9, at 1140 & n.187; Marisam, 
Duplicative Delegations, supra note 9, at 222–23 (noting that cognitive and experiential diversity 
from different agencies provides new and relevant information to problem solving). 
25. Freeman & Rossi, at 1185; Neal Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s 
Most Power Branch From Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2325 (2006). 
26. See, e.g., David Weil, Crafting a Progressive Workplace Regulatory Policy, 28 COMP. LAB. L. 
& POL’Y J. 125, 125–26 (2007). 
27. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1192. 
28. For the rich political science literature on how bureaucracies function and the 
complexities of bureaucratic motivation, see, e.g., MARISSA MARTINO GOLDEN, WHAT 
MOTIVATES BUREAUCRATS? 1–39 (2000); JOHN BREHM & SCOTT GATES, WORKING, 
SHIRKING, AND SABOTAGE 1–108 (1997); JAMES WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 10–378 (1989).  For 
importance of Executive and agency personnel buy-in, see, e.g., Oswalt & Marzán, supra note 6, 
at 435; id. at 460 (“Chicago MOUs tend to be vague, pop-up only intermittently, and exist as an 
uncertain foundation for deep and sustained collaboration. Put differently, MOUs are really ‘soft’ 
law.”); Javesh Rathod, Protecting Immigrant Workers Through Interagency Cooperation, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 
1157, 1160 (2011) (describing Bush Administration’s “silen[ce] about the 1998 MOU between 
the DOL and the INS, with advocates questioning its ongoing applicability”). 
29. For Presidential control over interagency coordination and enforcement, see, e.g., Kate 
Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1038 (2013) (arguing that 
“presidential enforcement should facilitate interagency coordination, further accountability and 
efficacy in agency enforcement efforts through information sharing, and shape the broad strokes 
of enforcement policy”); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2285-
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B. Labor MOUs: Collecting the Data Set 
To assess the nature and scope of interagency coordination on labor 
market regulation, I collected publicly available MOUs between agencies 
and sub-agencies that regulate labor and labor markets: the DOL, NLRB, 
EEOC, DOJ-Antitrust Division, FTC, Treasury Department, IRS, and the 
Federal Reserve.  Because there are no generally applicable statutes or 
Executive Orders on the use of MOUs, they are mostly created at the 
discretion of agencies, and there is no single database that collects them for 
tracking and assessment.  While the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) may 
require agencies to publish MOUs in rare circumstances, agencies do not 
routinely do so absent those circumstances.30  When MOUs are published, 
agencies tend to publish them in the Federal Register or on agency websites. 
My analysis of existing MOUs occurred in two stages.  First, I collected the 
MOUs through web searches on each of the agencies’ websites, internet 
searching, and electronic searching of the Federal Register.31  These searches 
yielded ninety-eight MOUs. I found an additional fourteen MOUs, which were 
identified or referenced in MOUs contained within the original list, yielding a 
total of 112 MOUs.  After collecting the MOUs, I hand-coded them to identify 
in their substantive terms twenty-two common characteristics and functions.  
 
99 (2001).  For congressional control over interagency coordination and enforcement, see, e.g., 
Brian Feinstein, Congress in the Administrative State, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1187 (2018). 
30. See 5 U.S.C. § 522(a)(1) (requiring publication only if agreements are “statements of 
general policy” or if they alter agency procedures.  But see id. § 552(b)(5) (allowing agencies to 
withhold from disclosure “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would 
not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency. . . .”).  See 
also EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 89–91 (1973) (holding that inter- and intra-agency MOUs may be 
withheld from disclosure if they are predecisional and “deliberative,” such that disclosure could 
inhibit candid agency discussion); Ctr. for Medicare Advocacy, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 577 F. Supp. 2d 221, 236–37 (D.D.C. 2008) (exempting draft MOU submitted to general 
counsel for review from FOIA disclosure); Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1190 n. 275. 
31. The EEOC, DOL, OSHA, and NLRB MOUs were all searchable and retrievable on 
agency websites.  See Memoranda of Understanding, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/mou/memoranda-understanding (last visited July 31, 2021); Federal 
Enforcement and Outreach Coordination, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/ag
encies/whd/about/federal-coordination (last visited July 31, 2021);  Memorandums of 
Understanding, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.osha.gov/laws-regs/mou/publicationdate 
(last visited July 31, 2021); NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/guidance/memos-
research/operations-management-memos.  The internet searches were conducted through 
Google and utilized conjunctive search terms with the agency or sub-agency name (e.g., 
“Department of Labor”) and “Memorandum of Agreement,” “Memorandum of 
Understanding,” and “Memorandum”. 
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C. Historical Development of Labor MOUs as Interagency Networks 
This novel data set not only illuminates a revisionist history of administrative 
collaboration on labor regulation but also reveals a selective web of longstanding 
networks that has favored certain areas of regulatory sharing over others.  This 
Section first provides the untold history of interagency coordination on labor 
regulation.  This historical account revises earlier tracing of interagency 
coordination to President Reagan’s creation of the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in 1980, revealing instead that such coordination 
began as early as the Nixon Administration.32  It then provides a bird’s-eye view 
of the interagency networks that shape and impact labor market regulation. 
1. The History of Labor MOUs 
Just as individual agency control through presidential administration can serve 
pro- and deregulatory directives, so, too, can control over the networks of 
interagency coordination through MOUs.33  Because there has been limited 
congressional administration of interagency labor regulation through statutes, the 
use of MOUs—driven by presidential administrations—tells an important story 
regarding the footprint of labor regulation as Presidents have come and gone.  
While labor agency leadership did not sign any MOUs between their 
respective agencies during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, these 
administrations made considerable efforts to bolster interagency 
coordination under the Executive’s control.  In 1960, a Kennedy 
Administration-commissioned report tasked with studying how best to 
structure and ensure the proper functioning of the administrative agencies 
concluded that the absence of interagency coordination inhibited the 
development of regulatory policy and would be improved by greater 
executive control.34  For example, the report found a “complete barrenness” 
of interagency policy formulation and a lack of interagency communication, 
 
32. For traditional accounts, see, e.g., Kagan, supra note 29, at 2275.  A minority of 
accounts trace centralized review to President Roosevelt’s creation of the Executive Office of 
the President (EOP), relocating the Bureau of Budget (OMB’s predecessor) within the Office.  
See, e.g., PERI ARNOLD, MAKING THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY 114–15(1998); Andrias, supra 
note 29, at 1055–58; Stephen Skowronek, The Conservative Insurgency and Presidential Power, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 2070 (2009). 
33. For the oscillation of pro- and deregulatory administrative action and inaction 
through presidential administration, see, e.g., Kagan, supra note 29, at 2248–49, 2315–19; 
Andrias, supra note 29, at 1054–77; Bijal Shah, Executive (Agency) Administration, 72 STAN. L. 
REV. 641, 693–701 (2020). 
34. See James Landis, U.S. Senate Subcomm. on Admin. Practice & Procedure, 86th 
Cong., Rep. on Regulatory Agencies to the President-Elect, 24–31 (1960). 
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but while it found a number of areas in need of better coordination—energy, 
competition, telecommunications, and other policy areas—it did not include 
labor policy among them, most likely because the EEOC, Occupational 
Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), Mine Safety and Health 
Administration (MSHA), and other DOL sub-agencies had not yet been 
established.35  The Johnson Administration’s Great Society programs tackled 
poverty alleviation through significant coordinated action within the 
administrative state, and in addition to signing Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, which established the EEOC,36 Johnson issued Executive Order 
11,246 in 1965 charging the Secretary of Labor with responsibility for 
ensuring equal opportunity for minorities in federal contractors’ recruitment, 
hiring, training, and other employment practices,37 creating the Office of 
Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP).38  But the Johnson 
Administration established neither formal nor informal relationships 
between the agencies tasked with regulating labor markets. 
The first effort to utilize MOUs to ensure interagency coordination on labor 
policy began during the Nixon Administration (1969–1974), as the number of 
agencies regulating labor and labor market conditions began proliferating. 
 
 
35. Id. at 24.  The Report did, however, recommend reversing the Taft-Hartley Act’s 
deprivation of the NLRB’s “power to initiate proceedings, transferring this function to an 
independent General Counsel,” through Presidential reorganization.   Id. at 4. 
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964). 
37. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965). 
38. See James Moeller, Executive Order No. 11,246: Presidential Power to Regulate Employment 
Discrimination, 43 MO. L. REV. 451, 458 & n.43 (1978). 
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 Table 1. Rise of Federal Agencies Regulating Labor and Employment 
 
In a comprehensive move to decentralize federal labor regulation, the 
Nixon Administration’s “New Federalism” placed more responsibility on 
state and local actors, replacing federal grants-in-aid with block grants to 
those governments.39  Decentralization also occurred as a component of the 
Nixon’s Administration’s deregulatory efforts within the new network of 
proliferating agencies.  Specifically, the Administration established 
interagency networks to minimize multi-agency jurisdiction over regulated 
parties and to use agencies as checks on other agencies’ actions, reducing 
regulatory burdens on businesses. First, MOUs were used between 1970 
and 1974 to draw jurisdictional boundaries between the fledgling labor 
agencies—OSHA, OFCCP, MSHA, EEOC—with respect to each other 
and outside agencies to ensure that businesses were not being investigated 
and placed in compliance reviews by more than one agency, particularly 
with respect to worker health and safety standards developed and exported 
by OSHA to other agencies.40  Second, in addition to broader structural 
reforms expanding presidential control over the administrative state, 
 
39. See, e.g., David Balducchi & Alison Pasternak, Federal-State Relations in Labor Exchange 
Policy, LABOR EXCHANGE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES, 37–38 (2004). 
40. See, e.g., infra Appendix A, OFCCP-EEOC MOU (1970); MESA-ATF MOU (July 1, 
1971); AEC-OSHA MOU (Feb. 4, 1974); FDA-OSHA MOU (Apr. 10, 1974); OSHA-CPSC 
MOU (Apr. 11, 1974); OSHA-USDA Extension Service MOU (Apr. 15, 1974); OSHA-ATF 
MOU (Aug. 8, 1974). 
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President Nixon established a “Quality of Life” (QOL) review process in 
October 1971 requiring the newly-established OSHA, among other 
agencies, to submit “significant” regulations to centralized review for 
interagency comment.  Nixon and subsequent Republican administrations 
used the process as a deregulatory measure, mandating consideration of 
regulatory alternatives and estimating costs elaborated by other agencies, 
like the EPA, to reduce the burdens OSHA rules placed on industry.41  
Then-OMB Director George Schultz explained the purpose of QOL 
review as establishing “a procedure for improving the inter-agency 
coordination of proposed agency regulations, standards, guidelines, and 
similar materials pertaining to environmental quality, consumer 
protection, and occupational and public health and safety.”42  
The Ford Administration furthered the trend of centralizing review of 
labor market regulation to promote deregulatory goals, issuing Executive 
Order 11,821 in 1974 requiring executive agencies to prepare “inflation 
impact statements” prior to issuing major rules.43  The Order also created a 
new agency in the Executive Office of the President (EOP)—the Council on 
Wage and Price Stability (CWPS)—with broad authority to coordinate both 
Executive and independent agency compliance.44 But this centralized review 
was not operationalized via information-sharing or other interagency 
coordination through MOUs.  The only two labor MOUs signed during the 
Ford Administration merely formalized referral procedures between ETA 
and ESA regarding migrant workers and sought to minimize duplicative 
litigation between OSHA and the NLRB regarding retaliatory actions taken 
by employers against workers who reported workplace health and safety 
violations.45  Thus, similar to the Nixon Administration, Ford’s presidential 
 
41. See Memorandum from George Schultz, Agency Regulations, Standards, and 
Guidelines Pertaining to Environmental Quality, Consumer Protection, and 
Occupational and Public Health and Safety (Oct. 5, 1971); Andrias, supra note 29, at 
1057–59; David Lewis & Terry Moe, The Presidency and the Bureaucracy, THE PRESIDENCY 
AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 389–93 (9th ed. 2010); Robert Percival, Checks Without 
Balance: Executive Office Oversight of the Environmental Protection Agency , 54 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 127, 128 & n.4, 135, 150 & n.133, 181. 
42. Office of Management and Budget Plays Critical Part in Environmental 
Policymaking, Faces Little External Review, 7 ENVIR. L. RPTR. (BNA) 693 (1976). 
43. Exec. Order 11,821, 3 C.F.R. 926–27 (1974). 
44. See generally W. Kip Viscusi, Presidential Oversight: Controlling the Regulators, 2 J. POL’Y 
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 157, 159–60 (1983). 
45. See Memorandum of Understanding between Manpower Administration (the 
predecessor to the Employment and Training Administration) and Employment Standards 
Administration regarding Stranded Migrants (March 1975); Memorandum of Understanding 
between Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, and the 
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administration used top-down, centralized review of agencies’ labor market 
regulation and interagency collaboration to avoid overregulation. 
That approach to labor regulation shifted with the Carter Administration.  
While President Carter also took aggressive steps to centralize presidential 
regulatory review—directing agencies in 1977 to give more detailed 
consideration to “the economic cost of major government regulations” and 
requesting CWPS to analyze the inflationary implications of regulations46—
his Administration expanded the use of MOUs from controlling 
overregulation to filling in the gaps of caused by under regulation.  In 
comparison to President Ford’s two MOUs, the one-term Carter 
Administration oversaw fifteen.47  The bulk of these MOUs worked to 
establish relationships between OSHA and outside agencies to train and 
extend entry of OSHA compliance officers to areas within those agencies’ 
jurisdiction, such as work on ammunition plants (1978), mine sites, and 
milling operations (1979, 1980), the Outer Continental Shelf (1979), in small 
businesses (1980), and on hazardous waste sites (1980).48  The Carter 
Administration also sought to ensure coordination between OSHA and ESA 
to ensure compliance with housing protections for migrant farmworkers 
(1978, 1979), and to ensure against discrimination through collaborative 
relationships between the OFCCP and non-labor agencies like the 
Department of Transportation (1979).49  Finally, President Carter was the 
first to try to bridge gaps in policymaking and enforcement between the 
NLRB as an independent agency and Executive agencies, signing the first 
MOUs between the NLRB and DOL’s Wage and Hour Division (1978), 
OSHA (1979), MSHA (1980) as well as the EEOC (1980).50 
Like prior Republican Administrations, President Reagan’s eight-year 
term took a strong, deregulatory turn, famously through Executive Order 
12,291, which centralized regulatory review of significant agency actions in 
the newly-created OIRA within OMB.51  The Executive Order tasked 
agencies with submitting regulatory impact analyses of major rules they 
wished to promulgate and required, to the extent permitted by law, that 
agencies regulate only if the potential benefits of regulating outweighed the 
 
General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board, 40 Fed. Red. 26083 (1975).  
46. Percival, supra note 41, at n.66, 143 (quoting James Miller, Lessons of the Economic Impact 
Statement Program, 1 REGULATION, July/Aug. 1977, at 14, 14 quoting President Carter). 
47. See infra Appendix A. 
48. See id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. See Exec. Order 12,291 § 3, 3 C.F.R. 127, 128–30 (1981).  For overview, see, e.g., 
Andrias, supra note 29, at 1058–59. 
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costs.52  The Reagan Administration also gave OMB the authority to assess 
the adequacy of impact analyses submitted to it and to prevent publication 
of proposed or final rules until it completed its regulatory review.53  And 
similar to prior Republican Administrations, President Reagan coupled top-
down control of administrative agency action with a deregulatory approach 
to interagency coordination, concerned primarily with overlapping agency 
jurisdiction and overregulation.  The Reagan Administration oversaw the 
signing of twelve MOUs in eight years, over half of which were concerned 
with ensuring consistency in workplace safety and health standards between 
OSHA and other agencies tasked with regulating workplace health and 
safety so that businesses were not subject to inconsistent regulations.54  
Similarly, to avoid duplicative workplace discrimination investigations, 
President Reagan revived the Nixon–Ford MOU between OFCCP and 
EEOC and oversaw the signing of the first MOU between the FCC and 
Office of the Special Counsel with the EEOC.55  President Bush’s 
Administration followed suit with the same priorities, overseeing the signing 
of nine MOUs focused mostly on avoiding overregulation of workplace 
health and safety (six MOUs) and workplace discrimination (one MOU) 
violations.56  Three MOUs signed between OSHA and the EPA during the 
Reagan and Bush Administrations stemmed from judicial decisions 
mandating interagency coordination on standard-setting for exposure to 
toxic substances under the Toxic Substances Control Act.57 
As then-Professor Elena Kagan has argued, President Clinton’s 
Administration demonstrated that centralized review of agency actions could 
be just as pro-regulatory as it could deregulatory.58  In addition to fortifying 
centralized review of independent agency rulemaking through Executive 
 
52. Exec. Order 12,291 §§ 2, 3, 3 C.F.R. at 128–30. 
53. Id. § 3(e)–(f); 3 C.F.R. at 129–30. 
54. See infra Appendix A, MOUs signed between OSHA-USDA Food & Inspection 
Service (May 20, 1982); U.S. Coast Guard-DOT-OSHA (Mar. 4, 1983); OSHA-Commerce 
Department National Bureau of Standards (Oct. 27, 1983); FSA-OSHA (Nov. 4, 1983); 
OSHA-ESA-ETA (Jan. 31, 1984); OSHA-NLRB General Counsel (Feb. 11, 1985); NIOSH-
OSHA-Coast Guard-EPA (Jan. 7, 1986); EPA-DOL (Feb. 6, 1986); and MSHA-DOE (1987). 
55. See infra Appendix A. 
56. Id. 
57. See infra Appendix A, MOUs signed on Feb. 6, 1986 (covering interagency reports 
between the EPA and OSHA under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)); Nov. 23, 
1990 (governing workplace conditions under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH 
Act)); Feb. 13, 1991 (establishing a structure to implement the Nov. 23, 1990, MOU governing 
workplace conditions under OSH).  For fuller discussion, see infra Part II.A. 
58. See Kagan, supra note 29, at 2249, 2282–316 (reviewing Clinton’s strategies for 
exercising control over administrative action through executive orders). 
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Orders, formal directives, and personal appropriation, President Clinton 
directed the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to research and 
evaluate major management challenges and program risks resulting from 
failures of inter- and intra-agency coordination on labor regulation.59  The first 
GAO Report, completed in 1999, recommended that DOL “be more 
proactive in engaging all agencies with collateral responsibilities relat[ed] to 
Labor’s missions” because “[l]abor has shown limited capacity to effectively 
coordinate the activities of the many units at the federal, state, and local levels 
that share responsibility for implementing worker protection laws and various 
workforce development programs.”60  Importantly, the Report found that 
“[l]abor lacks accurate and reliable information needed to effectively assess 
whether many of its programs are producing their intended results and to 
determine whether its resources are being used effectively.”61  However, the 
Report made no references to MOUs as a tool for enabling coordination and 
information-sharing.  The 2001 Report also found coordination problems, 
particularly between OSHA and WHD, and recommended that Labor 
“improve coordination with other agencies that have similar responsibilities to 
increase program effectiveness, ensure worker protections, and minimize 
employers’ compliance burdens,” but again made no reference to MOUs.62 
Despite his lack of specific attention in GAO reports, during his 
Administration, President Clinton oversaw the signing of eighteen 
MOUs, facilitating coordination between federal agencies on labor 
regulation.  The majority of these MOUs concentrated on coordinating 
workplace discrimination and workplace health and safety regulation 
between anchoring agencies—the EEOC and OSHA, respectively—and 
outside agencies.  Four MOUs coordinated discrimination-related 
trainings, investigations, and claims between the EEOC and the NLRB 
(1993), the Office of Special Counsel (1997), the ESA (1999), and the 
OFCCP (1999).63  Nine MOUs strengthened OSHA coordination, workplace 
 
59. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 638–43 (1994); Kagan, supra note 29, 
at 2281–303. 
60. U.S. Gen. Acct. Off., Dep’t of Lab., GAO/OCG-99-11, Major Management 
Challenges and Program Risks, 1, 7 (Jan. 1999). 
61. Id. at 16. 
62. U.S. Gen. Acct. Off., Dep’t of Lab., GAO-01-251, Major Management Challenges 
and Program Risks, 7, 10 (Jan. 2001). 
63. See infra Appendix A (listing the MOUs between the EEOC and other agencies related 
to discrimination).  Two related to coordination on disability- and immigration-related 
discrimination after the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act and amendments to 
the Immigration and Nationality Act.  Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
12101– 03.; INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b. 
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safety, and health protection enforcement with the Department of Agriculture 
(1994), the Department of Energy (1994, 1995, 2000), the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (1996, 1998), the EPA (1996), the Chemical Safety and Hazard 
Investigation Board (1998), and the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) (2000), 
particularly in areas where deregulation and the use of contractor-operated 
facilities had blurred the lines of authority and created potential regulatory 
gaps between agencies.64  The Clinton Administration was also the first to 
formalize the relationship between the FTC and DOJ Antitrust Division 
concerning merger clearance investigations, even though those MOUs neither 
addressed nor allocated review of the impacts of mergers in labor markets.65 
Between 2001 and 2010, the Bush Administration signed—or re-signed—
only one labor-related MOU, that between OSHA and the FAA,66 and his 
Department of Labor moved away from aggressive enforcement in favor of 
voluntary compliance and deregulation.67  However, the Bush Administration 
informally encouraged interagency coordination between OSHA, the EPA, 
and DOJ prosecutors to identify and prosecute egregious workplace safety 
violators.68  The idea was that, by pooling their resources and statutory 
 
64. See infra Appendix A. 
65. See Fed. Trade Comm’n & Antitrust Div. of the U.S. Dep’t of Just., Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Fed. Trade Comm’n and the Antitrust Div. of the U.S. Dep’t of 
Just. concerning Clearance Procedures for Investigations (1993); Fed. Trade Comm’n & 
Antitrust Div. of the U.S. Dep’t of Just., Memorandum of Understanding between the Fed. 
Trade Comm’n and the Antitrust Div. of the U.S. Dep’t of Just. concerning Clearance 
Procedures for Investigations (1995); see also Antitrust Div. of the U.S. Dep’t of Just., Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, & Dep’t of Agric., Memorandum of Understanding between the Antitrust Div., Dep’t 
of Just., the Fed. Trade Comm’n, and the Dep’t of Agric. Relative to Cooperation with Respect 
to Monitoring Competitive Conditions in the Agricultural Marketplace (Aug. 31, 1999). 
66. Fed. Aviation Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Transp., & Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 
Dep’t of Lab., Memorandum of Understanding between the Fed. Aviation Admin., U.S. Dep’t 
of Transp., and Occupational Safety & Health Admin. concerning the Protection of Employees 
who Provide Air Safety Information (Mar. 22, 2002); 67 Fed. Reg. 55,883 (Aug. 30, 2002). 
67. See, e.g., U.S. Gen. Acct. Off., Dep’t of Lab., GAO-09-458T, Wage & Hour Div.’s 
Complaint Intake and Investigative Processes Leave Low Wage Workers Vulnerable to Wage 
Theft (2009) 1, 1 (highlighting the inadequacy of the Wage and Hour Division’s response to 
complaints); U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Off. of Inspector Gen., Rep. No. 02-09-203-10-105, 
Employers with Reported Fatalities Were Not Always Properly Identified and Inspected 
Under OSHA’s Enhanced Enforcement Program (2009) 1, 1–2 (reviewing the effectiveness of 
the Enhanced Enforcement Program (EEP)); Michael Fletcher, Labor Dep’t. Accused of Straying 
From Enforcement, WASH. POST, (Dec. 1, 2008), https://www-washingtonpost-com.proxy
wcl.wrlc.org/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/30/AR2008113001900_pf.html (noting the 
Bush Administration declined enforcement actions). 
68. See David Barstow & Lowell Bergman, With Little Fanfare, a New Effort to Prosecute 
Employers That Flout Safety Laws, N.Y. TIMES, (May 2, 2005), https://www.nyt
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mandates, the agencies could seek steeper penalties from chronic and 
flagrant violators under environmental, criminal racketeering, and corporate 
fraud laws, and that DOJ officials could train OSHA inspectors and 
attorneys on how to spot criminal violations for referral for enforcement.69  
While the Bush Administration abandoned the initiative in 2005, the Obama 
Administration revived and expanded it.70  The Bush Administration also 
established a new unit within ETA—the Office of Performance and 
Results—to coordinate efforts to identify and share best practices for 
measuring agency performance, but the GAO recommended that DOL 
“take a broader, cross-program perspective” to “emerging issues related to 
potential labor and skills shortages,” which would “require[] coordinating 
more closely with other federal agencies,” particularly to “enhanc[e] training 
programs for developing skilled workers and developing approaches to retain 
older workers in the workforce.”71  GAO’s 2003 report included for the first 
time a designated section on “Coordinating Enforcement Efforts with Other 
Agencies” and called on DOL to engage in more extensive coordination, 
especially as between OSHA, EPA, ATF, and the Chemical Safety and 
Hazard Investigation Board to protect workers’ health at hazardous materials 
workplaces.72  The report made no reference to MOUs. 
The Obama Administration switched gears to embark on one of the most 
robust presidential efforts at regulatory coordination seen yet, beginning with 
the issuance on January 18, 2011, of a Memorandum on Regulatory 
Compliance directing federal executive department agencies to develop 
plans for making compliance information easily accessible while also 
directing OMB officials to develop tools to make cross-agency comparisons 
possible and to “engage[] the public in new and creative ways of using the 
information.”73  Further, it directed OMB officials—the Chief Information 
 
imes.com/2005/05/02/politics/with-little-fanfare-a-new-effort-to-prosecute-employers-that
-flout.html (discussing how the Bush Administration employed penalties to encourage 
compliance with labor laws rather than enforcement actions). 
69. Id. 
70. See id.; see also Andrias, supra note 29, at 1087; Maureen Tracey-Mooney, Honoring 29 
Miners, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/04/
05/honoring-29-miners. 
71. U.S. Gen. Acct. Off., GAO-03-106, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR: MAJOR MANAGEMENT 
CHALLENGES AND PROGRAM RISKS 2, 4 (2003). 
72. Id. at 20. 
73. Presidential Memorandum on Regulatory Compliance, 76 Fed. Reg. 3825, 3825–26 
(Jan. 18, 2011).  Independent agencies were also encouraged to make their own information 
available under the directive. President Obama rescinded Bush’s centralized  regulatory 
review Executive Order, returning to Clinton’s, supplementing his approach again two 
years later to add to that review consideration of scientific integrity and the distributional 
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Officer (CIO) and the Chief Technology Officer (CTO)—to collaborate with 
agencies to identify how best to generate and share information about 
enforcement and compliance across the government, stating that “[e]fforts 
to share data across agencies, where appropriate and permitted by law, may 
help to promote flexible and coordinated enforcement regimes.”74  It was the 
first effort in government history to create a centralized system through 
which agencies could pool compliance information.75 
The Obama Administration also took a much more aggressive approach 
to enforcement in labor markets, implementing a system of “strategic 
enforcement” to prioritize high-propensity violators,76 particularly in the 
fissured, or vertically-disintegrated, workplace dominated by relationships 
of subcontracting, outsourcing, and temporary, arms-length contracting for 
labor services.77  A significant component of the Administration’s approach 
to strategic enforcement was in pioneering truly expansive use of MOUs to 
ensure interagency coordination on worker protections and labor market 
regulation, signing thirty-one MOUs establishing information sharing, 
accountability, and referral authority between agencies—more than any 
Administration before or since.78  In fact, a significant proportion of all 
labor MOUs since 1970—a full 34%—were signed during the Obama 
administration.79  The Administration used MOUs to make unprecedented 
efforts in building institutional relationships between agencies to streamline 
investigations and enforcement, including between DOL and its sub-
agencies, the EEOC, and the NLRB.80  The Obama Administration also 
 
impacts of rulemaking in that agency actions while also encouraging public participation 
and independent regulatory agency engagement in retrospective review.  See Exec. Order 
No. 13,497, 3 C.F.R. § 218 (2010) (revoking Exec. Order Nos. 13,258 and 13422); Exec. 
Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. § 215 (2012) (amending Exec. Order No. 12,866). 
74. Presidential Memorandum on Regulatory Compliance, 76 Fed. Reg. 3825, 3825–
26 (Jan. 18, 2011).  
75. Andrias, supra note 29, at 1068–69. 
76. See Weil, Strategic Enforcement, supra note 7, at 1–2 (reviewing strategies for enforcement); 
OMB WATCH, THE OBAMA APPROACH TO PUBLIC PROTECTION: ENFORCEMENT 2, 4 (2010), 
https://www.foreffectivegov.org/sites/default/files/regs/obamamidtermrulemakingreport.pdf 
(analyzing the Obama Administration’s use of enforcement).  
77. For the fissured workplace, see generally DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: 
WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 3–5 
(2014) (describing the fissured workplace). 
78. See infra Appendix A (listing MOUs filed during the Obama Administration). 
79. See infra Appendix A (providing labor MOUs between 1970 and 2020). 
80. See U.S. Dep’t of Lab. & Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, Memorandum of 
Understanding between U.S. Dep’t of Lab. and Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n (Nov. 7, 
2011), 76 Fed. Reg. 71,029, 71,030 (Nov. 7, 2011) (promoting collaboration between the 
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doubled down on interagency coordination on worker safety and health 
issues, overseeing the signing of twelve MOUs between OSHA and MSHA 
with outside agencies like DHS, the FDA, DOE, the NRC, the Federal Rail 
Administration, the NLRB, the FAA, ATF, the EPA, and the Departments 
of Defense and Transportation.81   
A unique feature of the Obama Administration’s interagency 
coordination was its use of MOUs to target policy priorities in a range of 
underregulated areas or areas where workers were particularly vulnerable.82  
For example, agency officials signed MOUs to avoid conflicts between 
workers’ rights and immigration enforcement agencies to protect immigrant 
workers,83 to expand protection to whistleblowers,84 to streamline criminal 
prosecutions of worker safety laws with the DOJ,85 to extend worker 
protections to Federal and Indian lands, in state and local government, 
through federal contracting, to recipients of federal financial assistance, and 
to enable workforce development in rural communities.86  And, as part of a 
larger Misclassification Initiative in Vice President Biden’s Middle Class 
Task Force, the Obama Administration sought coordination between DOL 
and the IRS, which motivated the signing of an MOU to:  
help reduce the incidence of misclassification of employees as independent contractors, 
help reduce the tax gap, and improve compliance with federal labor laws . . . , enabl[ing] 
both agencies to leverage existing resources and send a consistent message to employers 
 
EEOC and DOL); U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Wage & Hour Div. & the Nat’l Lab. Relations Bd., 
Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Wage & Hour Div., and 
the Nat’l Lab. Relations Bd. (Dec. 14, 2016); U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Wage & Hour Div. & Equal 
Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. Dep’t of 
Lab., Wage & Hour Div. and the U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n (Jan. 6, 2017). 
81. See infra Appendix A, MOUs signed between OSHA and MSHA and outside agencies 
on: June 10, 2010; Sept. 16, 2010; Jan. 21, 2011; June 20, 2011; Sept. 6, 2013; Apr. 17, 2014; 
May 21, 2014; Aug. 26, 2014; Oct. 7, 2014; July 31, 2015; Dec. 1, 2015; and June 30, 2016. 
82. See infra Appendix A (listing MOUs signed during the Obama Administration). 
83. See infra Appendix A (referencing MOUs signed between DOL and the NLRB with 
DHS, ICE, and the DOJ-Civil Rights Division on Mar. 31, 2011, Dec. 7, 2011, July 9, 2013, 
May 6, 2016, Jan. 12, 2017, and Jan. 13, 2017). 
84. See infra Appendix A (highlighting MOUs signed on Jan. 14, 2014, Mar. 6, 2014, and 
Jan. 12, 2017). 
85. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. DEPARTMENTS OF LABOR 
AND JUSTICE ON CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS OF WORKER SAFETY LAWS (Dec. 17, 2015). 
86. See infra Appendix A (detailing MOUs signed between MSHA and BLM (Dec. 27, 
2011), ETA and DHHS (Feb. 9, 2012), EEOC and DOJ-Civil Rights Division (July 23, 2015), 
DOL and GSA (July 9, 2013), and EEOC and DHHS (Jan. 13, 2017)). 
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about their duties to properly pay their employees and to pay employment taxes.87   
Finally, the Obama Administration made ad hoc use of interagency 
MOUs to respond to crises after the Deepwater Horizon rig explosion on 
April 20, 201088 and following a deadly salmonella outbreak, 89 all to share 
information between agencies on health and safety problems relevant to their 
respective regulatory and enforcement responsibilities as well as implement 
training programs for their staff.   
The Trump Administration’s interagency coordination has been primarily 
deregulatory, seeking to reduce any overlap or redundancies that may impose 
additional burdens on regulated parties,90 but also, importantly, using MOUs 
and executive orders to strengthen anti-immigration policy,91 undermine 
existing workplace protections against discrimination, and centralize control 
over independent agencies by Executive agencies.92  First, the Trump 
Administration oversaw the signing of three MOUs to strengthen immigration 
enforcement, interagency coordination on foreign labor certification, and 
impose information sharing requirements on the U.S. Census Bureau to share 
census data on national origin to inform federal contracting policy at the 
OFCCP.93  Thus, like the Obama Administration, President Trump mobilized 
 
87. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 
AND THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (Sept. 19, 2011); Press Release, Dep’t of Lab., Labor 
Secretary, IRS Comm’r Sign Memorandum of Understanding to Improve Agencies’ 
Coordination on Emp. Misclassification Compliance and Educ. (Sept. 19, 2011), 
https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/whd/whd20110919. 
88. See MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND 
HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND THE FEDERAL ON SCENE 
COORDINATOR, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY CONCERNING OCCUPATIONAL 
SAFETY AND HEALTH ISSUES RELATED TO THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL RESPONSE 
(June 10, 2010); NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE 
DRILLING (2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-
OILCOMMISSION.pdf. 
89. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND 
HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND THE FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES SHARING HEALTH AND 
SAFETY INFORMATION WHERE FOOD IS PRODUCED, PROCESSED, OR HELD (June 20, 2011). 
90. See Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Feb. 3, 2017).  
91. See Immigration Executive Actions Under the Trump Administration, NAFSA, 
https://www.nafsa.org/professional-resources/browse-by-interest/immigration-executive-
actions-under-trump-administration (last visited July 30, 2021).  
92. See infra Appendix A (listing MOUs signed during the Trump Administration). 
93. See infra Appendix A (citing MOUs between OFCCP and the Census Bureau (June 
19, 2017), DOL-WHD and DOL-ETA (Sept. 29, 2017), and DOJ-Civil Rights Division and 
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interagency coordination through MOUs to coordinate policy objectives 
between agencies.  Second, the Trump Administration took aggressive steps to 
limit the scope, jurisdiction and discretion of independent agencies like the 
EEOC and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) by: (1) 
imposing information sharing requirements to allow Executive agency 
enforcement (or nonenforcement) of whistleblower protections; and (2) limit 
the EEOC’s independence by giving the OFCCP and/or the DOJ more 
leverage to enforce President Trump’s anti-discrimination policies, particularly 
with regard to discrimination on the basis of religion, sexual identity, and race-
based and sex-based stereotyping.94  In fact, the EEOC only agreed to the 
Trump Administration’s most recent MOU between the OFCCP, EEOC, 
and DOJ-Civil Rights Division on a partisan basis, with the two Democratic 
Commissioners rejecting the MOU as jeopardizing the agency’s independence 
and as granting Executive agencies more leverage to enforce Trump’s 
“Combating Race and Sex Stereotyping” Executive Order which banned 
certain topics from diversity and inclusion trainings.95  The Administration also 
oversaw the signing of an additional MOU that reduced agency overlap on 
workplace safety and health protections.96   
2. Networks of Interagency Labor Regulation: A Bird’s-Eye View 
The prior Section briefly traced the historical development of interagency 
coordination on labor regulation through MOUs, but a bird’s-eye view of 
the networks built over that time reveals a striking picture of where robust 
interconnections between agencies have developed and where they have not.  
The table below (Table 2) provides a numerical breakdown of the number of 
memorialized agreements signed by DOL, its sub-agencies, the NLRB, and 
the EEOC—the agencies most traditionally associated with regulating labor.   
 
DOL-ETA (July 31, 2018)). 
94. See infra Appendix A (listing MOUs between the CFPB and OSHA (Feb. 4, 2017), 
EEOC and DOJ-Civil Rights Division (Dec. 21, 2018), and OFCCP, EEOC, and DOJ-Civil 
Rights Division (Nov. 3, 2020)). 
95. See MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AMONG THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 
THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE (Nov. 3, 2020); Exec. Order 13,950, 85 Fed. Reg. 60683 (Sep. 22, 2020); EEOC, 
Preliminary Transcript: Meeting of November 2, 2020 – Discussion of a Memorandum of Understanding 
among the U.S. Department of Labor, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and the U.S. 
Department of Justice (Nov. 2, 2020), https://www.eeoc.gov/preliminary-transcript-meeting-
november-2-2020-discussion-memorandum-understanding-among-us. 
96. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER 
SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND THE OCCUPATIONAL 
SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (Apr. 14, 2017). 
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Table 2. MOUs Between DOL, NLRB, and EEOC 
 
This dataset reveals several interesting trends and patterns.  Nearly half of the 
discoverable, signed MOUs were between OSHA and other federal agencies, 
either to bridge the gap created under specific statutory exemptions that tasked 
other agencies with worker health and safety within their regulatory purviews or 
to avoid duplicate supervision of regulated parties’ workplace safety and health 
compliance.97  The following table (Table 3) illustrates the centrality of OSHA in 
building interagency relationships with labor and other agencies.   
 
 
Table 3. Network of Interagency MOUs 
 
Outside of OSHA and MSHA worker health and safety coordination, the 
 
97. For a full list of these MOUs, see infra Appendix A. 
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other labor agencies primarily have coordinated with immigration enforcement 
agencies, but not others.  Notably, for example, other than the single example 
during the Obama Administration discussed above, there is very little, if any, 
coordination between the labor agencies and the IRS through MOUs.98  And 
using the MOUs as a measure, there is no policy coordination, information 
exchange, or shared enforcement programming between the labor agencies 
and the Treasury Department or the Federal Reserve.  Also, importantly, there 
are no formal agreements to share any information between the labor agencies 
and the antitrust enforcement agencies.   
D. Purposes and Functions of Labor MOUs 
After consolidating and identifying which agencies were parties to 
MOUs and along what timeline,99 the next focus was on the substance of 
the agreements.  While scholars have theoretically deduced a number of 
reasons agencies may seek to coordinate—such as ironing out assignments 
for completing overlapping agency jurisdiction or functions or facilitating 
processes for Congressional delegations requiring agency concurrence100—
reviewing the labor MOUs themselves allowed a more comprehensive 
accounting of the articulated motives for their use.   
I hand-coded the 112 MOUs to identify the procedural and substantive 
obligations that were included in the MOU.  I identified twenty-two 
categories of cooperation, listed in the following table (Table 4), to help 
illuminate which functions these agreements were serving for the agencies:   
 
 
Table 4. Percentage of MOUs Containing Hand-Coded Categories of Cooperation 
 
98. But see Memorandum of Understanding between the Internal Revenue Service and 
the U.S. Dep’t of Labor (Sept. 19, 2011) (memorializing agreement to share information and 
collaborate to reduce employee misclassification). 
99. For a full timeline of the MOUs in chronological order, see infra Appendix A. 
100. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1146–55. 
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By far the most prominent purpose of the MOUs was to facilitate 
information-sharing between agencies.  The information-sharing ranged 
from sharing databases and employer information to sharing complaints, 
investigative materials, filings, research, and analyses. 65% of the agreements 
included information-sharing provisions.  And well over half—55%—
included provisions establishing permanent points of contact to handle 
communications between the agencies.  A much smaller number of 
agreements—23%—used the agreements to go beyond points of contact to 
establish new institutions—a new office or task force to coordinate between 
the two agencies.  But unlike examples provided by other agencies, such as 
the well-known 1999 MOU between the DOJ-Antitrust Division and the 
FTC allocating responsibility for merger enforcement, the labor agencies do 
not designate points of contact to facilitate communications between and 
among attorneys, economists, and technical experts staffed within the 
agencies—only political appointees.  And they do not require information-
sharing to provide legal, economic, and technical assistance that would help 
in the other agencies’ enforcement responsibilities.   
The third most prevalent provisions in the MOUs—contained in nearly 
half—established procedural mechanisms to ensure orderly exchange of 
information and coordination.  MOUs are also used to clarify jurisdictional 
boundaries between agencies (38% of MOUs had these provisions), to 
coordinate enforcement, and to train and exchange personnel so agencies 
are familiar with regulations and standards that govern enforcement under 
the other agency’s jurisdiction.  But less than a third of agreements 
established formal referral authority allowing one agency to refer for 
enforcement actions violations observed by the other agency.   
A quarter of the MOUs establish mutual reporting requirements, 
primarily regarding investigations and enforcement actions in areas of 
overlapping jurisdiction.  And 21% of them imposed consultation duties and 
obligations, primarily in advance of enforcement actions or engaging in 
policy-making that would establish standards that may impact the other 
agencies’ enforcement area or their regulated parties.  A much smaller 
number of agreements—20%—included provisions to coordinate 
investigations, so it is clear agencies are relying much more on information-
sharing from independently conducted investigations than joint investigation 
structures.  And 20% of agreements included provisions for joint 
policymaking to ensure requirements imposed on regulated parties are 
coherent. While 17% of the agreements imposed requirements on the other 
agency to ensure compliance with the MOU—for example, allowing one 
agency to review whether the other timely and properly referred complaints 
to it—only one agreement allowed the agency to ensure compliance through 
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an internal compliance review.  Thirteen percent of agreements included 
provisions about education and outreach, wherein the agencies agreed to 
educate the public and regulated parties about their mutually overlapping 
enforcement areas.  But only a small percentage—3.5%—committed the 
agencies to joint research under their respective mandates.  The vast majority 
of agreements renounced interagency resource compensation, but in seven 
percent of agreements, agencies committed to compensate each other for 
certain services performed under the MOU.  Only one agreement committed 
to providing the other agency with personnel and resources.  Fourteen percent 
of agreements included conflict resolution provisions to preempt disputes from 
derailing their collaboration, and nine percent included termination 
conditions.  Only one agreement—the one coordinating worker safety on the 
Deepwater Horizon clean-up—was signed for an ad hoc purpose limited and 
extending only to coordination around a single event.   
The fact agency officials signed so few of the MOUs—only 3.5%—due to 
statutory mandates is an interesting finding because it helps to answer the 
question of why agencies coordinate.  It suggests that agencies are not 
coordinating because Congress wants them to or envisions that they would 
collaborate to achieve the goals of specific statutes, but instead as a result of 
Executive Branch-led policy-setting.  And the fact that officials only signed 
one agreement—the one coordinating worker safety on the Deepwater 
Horizon clean-up—for an ad hoc, event-limited purpose suggests that 
agencies are not collaborating primarily to avert crisis or in an ad hoc 
manner, but rather because of relatively longer-term institutional needs to 
coordinate on policy objectives and enforcement.   
II. ANALYZING MOUS AS COORDINATION ON LABOR REGULATION 
While there is “no systematic, comprehensive, long-term, current analyses or 
comparisons of [interagency collaborative] arrangements to assess how well 
the[y] met their purposes or rationales” in general,101 a number of best practices 
can be derived from analysis of the full set of MOUs.  This Part analyzes core 
takeaways from the MOUs as a tool of interagency coordination on labor 
regulation based on their stated purposes and functions, deriving best practices 
but also highlighting what they reveal about agency coordination failures.   
A. Best Practices in Interagency Labor Regulation Through MOUs 
In reviewing the MOUs, it is clear that such agreements can be used to 
achieve effective interagency coordination that not only effectuates joint 
policy goals of the statutes agencies administer, but can also further mutual 
 
101. KAISER, supra note 9, at 23. 
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agency expertise, enforcement, investigation, and administrative efficiency.  
This Section discusses the most well-developed examples from the labor 
regulatory setting to illustrate what agencies can achieve when they develop 
robust coordination mechanisms through MOUs.   
The most well-developed agreements evolved out of decades of 
collaboration mandated by a combination of congressional coordination and 
judicial intervention, like the ones between OSHA and the EPA.102  The 
agencies signed five MOUs between 1980 and 1991, and through that long-
term collaboration, developed a robust system of joint-policy making, 
coordinated investigation and enforcement, referrals, interagency compliance 
reviews, personnel training programs and information sharing.  The Toxic 
Substances Control Act, and judge-made law interpreting Act, require OSHA 
to demonstrate a significant workplace risk to employees from toxic substances 
in order to regulate any substance, and those requirements compelled agency 
coordination.103  Pursuant to the courts’ requirements, OSHA had to collect 
data to show that its regulations were economically and technologically feasible 
for the industry as a whole.  Thus, judge-made law interpreting congressional 
requirements made access to EPA data and findings critical for OSHA to 
avoid its agency action being struck down on judicial review.  What this 
meant in practice was that, despite the highly deregulatory actions of the 
Reagan and Bush Administrations, the OSHA-EPA MOUs signed during 
that period had highly-developed cross-reporting, had robust interagency 
working groups, established a Data Exchange Committee, included a 
framework and efficient methodology for data exchange and data 
managers, incorporated unusually detailed timetables listing actions 
needed and deadlines for completion, and devised unprecedented 
training programs on their respective areas of expertise that went from 
the inspector level through to senior managers and policy planners.104  
The 1996 OSHA-EPA MOU, signed during the Clinton Administration, 
added even more robust coordination through joint on-scene 
investigations, and took the unprecedented and unique step among all the 
agreements to require that their respective reports be reviewed by 
independent experts to “assess the scope, approaches, and methods used” 
and require that the results of those independent reviews “guide and 
 
102. See infra Appendix A, MOUs between OSHA and EPA signed on Dec. 18, 1980; 
Jan. 19, 1981; Jan. 7, 1986; Feb. 6, 1986; and Feb. 13, 1991. 
103. Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. API, 448 U.S. 607 (1980); see also Indus. Union 
Dep’t v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 473–76 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (requiring that OSHA support its 
policies with substantial evidence); Sidney Shapiro & Thomas McGarity, Reorienting OSHA: 
Regulatory Alternatives and Legislative Reform, 6 YALE J. REG. 1, 57– 58 (1989). 
104. See supra note 102. 
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improve future studies, investigations, and reports.”105  The agencies also 
took the still unique step of requiring that “[n]either agency will enter a 
settlement agreement with any employer . . . that would compromise the 
sharing of information between agencies or use of information that may 
be lawfully disclosed in the development of a public report.”106 
The Clinton Administration also took the unique step of using an 
interagency MOU to establish for the first time points of contact and 
information-sharing beyond political appointees to instead also include 
attorneys, economists, and technical experts within the agencies.  The 
1999 MOU between the Department of Agriculture and the antitrust 
agencies—the DOJ and FTC—tasked the agencies with coordinating on 
monitoring competitive conditions in agricultural markets and established 
a primary contact person to facilitate communication between line 
attorneys, staff economists, and other technical experts, including to share 
information pertaining to legal, economic, and technical assistance 
believed to be potentially relevant and useful to the other agencies’ 
enforcement responsibilities.107 
MOUs signed during the Obama Administration built on these 
precedents to strengthen interagency relationships a robust set of criteria that 
built on and furthered obligations already present in existing MOUs.  For 
example, the information-sharing provisions of the Obama Administration 
MOUs, such as the 2011 OSHA-DOE MOU, added requirements that the 
agency with specific expertise as between the two signing agencies identify and 
prioritize certain data and information and incorporate analyses of such 
data.108  The 2011 EEOC-OFCCP MOU designated “Coordination 
Advocate[s]” at both agencies to streamline compliance coordination and 
mandated notification requirements for findings of cause, unsuccessful attempts 
to conciliate, and decisions not to file lawsuits, but they also established dual-filed 
complaints and charges, designating the OFCCP as the EEOC’s agent for 
receiving complaints and charges, making it simpler for workers and federal 
contractors to navigate the bureaucratic complaint process.109  
 
105. Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. Env’t Protection Agency Office 
of Solid Waste and Emergency Response Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance 
and the U.S. Dep’t of Occupational Safety and Health Administration on Chemical Accident 
Investigation (Dec. 1, 1996). 
106. Id. 
107. See infra Appendix A, MOU between DOJ-Antitrust Division, FTC, and USDA 
signed on Aug. 31, 1999. 
108. Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. Dep’t of Labor and the U.S. 
Dep’t of Energy 9–10 (Jan. 21, 2011). 
109. Memorandum of Understanding between U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Equal Employment 
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Coordinated investigation requirements also became more robust 
during the Obama Administration. For example, in the 2016 MSHA-
ATF MOU, the agencies went beyond mere referrals to require one 
agency’s—MSHA’s—inspectors to inform mine operators of discovered 
violations of ATF regulations, document those on ATF forms, and 
forward them to ATF for review.110  As part of the broader strategic 
enforcement efforts of David Weil and other Obama political appointees 
in the Department of Labor, 2016 and 2017 MOUs for the first time 
incorporated obligations for agencies to coordinate on “the experiences 
and enforcement perspectives of each agency in identifying and 
investigating complex employment structures” such as vertically-
disintegrated firms, subcontracting, outsourcing, and other supply-chain 
arrangements in the fissured workplace.111  So agencies were committing 
to a more systematic approach to regulation based on a deeper mutual 
understanding of workplace structures.  
This collection of MOUs makes clear that collaborative, iterative 
refinements in interagency agreements coupled with historical interagency 
relationships matter.  Agencies show real improvement over the course of 
their MOUs in terms of more robust commitments to one another, more 
efficient referral authority, and more effective procedural mechanisms for 
accountability and compliance.  Concretely establishing mechanisms for 
joint enforcement, joint investigation, and information-sharing that extends 
beyond political appointees can be used to target high-priority enforcement 
areas, identify such areas with shared expertise, and reduce inefficiencies that 
result from overlapping and underlapping enforcement or investigations.  
Judicial review, along with congressional coordination mandates established 
by statute, impacts interagency coordination, as seen in the OSHA-EPA 
MOUs.  Judicial review helps to facilitate interagency information sharing 
for more informed labor market regulation.  
 
Opportunity Commission, and the U.S. Dep’t of Justice 11 (Nov. 3, 2011). 
110. Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Mine Safety and 
Health Administration and the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms 
and Explosives (June 30, 2016). 
111. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage 
and Hour Division, and the National Labor Relations Board (Dec. 14, 2016); Memorandum 
of Understanding between the U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage and Hour Division and the U.S. 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Jan. 6, 2017); Memorandum of 
Understanding between the National Labor Relations Board and the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration, U.S. Dep’t of Labor (Jan. 12, 2017). 
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B. MOUs as Exposing Fragmentary and Underlapping Coordination 
Analysis of the MOUs also exposes a significant amount of 
fragmentation and underlapping coordination between agencies in their 
labor market regulation.  The MOUs reveal that what agencies are not 
doing is just as important as what they are doing.  
First, some agencies are more isolated and less collaborative than others, 
and the level of collaboration does not turn on whether the agency is an 
Executive or independent agency.  OSHA has by far the widest network of 
interagency agreements, but the EEOC places second, with the NLRB 
relatively isolated by comparison.  The NLRB’s MOUs are also narrower 
and more limited than other agencies’ MOUS and primarily deal with 
coordinating whistleblower complaints for violations under other work laws.  
They lack robust provisions for information sharing or interagency personnel 
training.  It took the NLRB forty years to update its first MOU with the Wage 
and Hour Division—from 1978 to 2016—and it did not use tools that other 
agencies had already developed to get data, analysis, and expertise-based aid 
in analyzing labor market conditions to better enforce the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA).112  Also, the NLRB’s policy of regulating primarily 
through adjudication rather than rulemaking resulted in a refusal to clarify 
policy positions through MOUs and set it further behind other agencies.  For 
example, its 1993 MOU with the EEOC reveals that it refused to “make 
policy” on issues of first impression pertaining to the intersection of the ADA 
and the NLRA.113  The EEOC sought clarity on, for example, whether the 
NLRA required bargaining with a union in selecting an effective reasonable 
accommodation and other questions, but its MOU negotiations with the 
NLRB were derailed and then limited only to procedural measures.  As a 
result, the limited number of MOUs that the NLRB entered into reinforce 
the idea that the NLRB has persisted in a form of administrative exile.114  
When agencies do coordinate with one another to promote seamless 
enforcement, they are not necessarily comprehensive in coordinating with all 
agencies.  For example, while the DOL and DHS signed an MOU to prevent 
conflicts in their worksite-based enforcement activities that may deter immigrant 
worker reporting of labor violations, the MOU did not extend to the NLRB or 
EEOC, nor was it “replicated in other areas of agency conflict.”115 
 
112.  Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage and Hour 
Division, and the NLRB (Dec. 14, 2016) (citing the Oct. 26, 1978 MOU). 
113. Memorandum of Understanding between the General Counsel of the NLRB and 
the EEOC (Nov. 16, 1993). 
114. See, e.g., Catherine Fisk & Deborah Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile, 
58 DUKE L. REV. 2013 (May 2009). 
115. Andrias, supra note 29, at 1088. 
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And not all agencies coordinate.  The Federal Reserve, IRS, and Treasury 
Departments have very limited interagency coordination with labor agencies 
to coordinate macroeconomic policy priorities.  This is particularly striking 
because agencies tasked with implementing macroeconomic and distributive 
policies are directly tasked with, and in fact directly regulate labor markets, 
unemployment rates, worker classifications for receiving benefits and 
immunities, all of which significantly impacting conditions of enforcement 
for other labor agencies.  Coordination gaps in these areas may limit labor 
agencies’ ability to upscale labor market regulation, or impact labor markets 
in specific industries or across particular shared policy goals, particularly in 
the context of economic recovery.  For example, failures to coordinate or 
build a robust network of collaboration regarding macroeconomic policy 
goals may limit agencies’ ability to work together on overcoming high 
unemployment rates and limit timely and efficient responses to economic 
downturns or other economy-wide labor market crises like the one we are 
witnessing with the pandemic and its accompanying recession.116  Further, 
the limited coordination between the labor agencies and the IRS, Treasury, 
and the Federal Reserve through MOUs suggests that none of the labor 
agencies are incorporating or benefiting from the analysis generated by those 
agencies, even if the Bureau of Labor Statistics furnishes much of the 
publicly-available data that goes into their modeling.  
Agencies have also not used MOUs to coordinate on structural labor 
market challenges resulting from increased employer power relative to 
worker power.117  As I and others have written elsewhere, enforcement of 
work law and antitrust law are interrelated.118  Antitrust law regulates 
unlawful employer buyer power over workers which can not only reduce 
workers’ bargaining leverage, wages, and hire rates, but also decrease 
workers’ ability to report or quit in response to employer violations of labor 
and employment law.  The DOL, NLRB, and EEOC have signed no MOUs 
to coordinate with the DOJ and FTC on labor market regulation of 
 
116. See How Government Jobs Programs Could Boost Employment URBAN INST. (May 6, 2020), 
https://www.urban.org/features/how-government-jobs-programs-could-boost-employment
#chapter-1 (providing examples how macroeconomic policies can boost employment); Kate 
Bahn & Carmen Sanchez Cumming, The Consequences of Job Displacement for U.S. Workers (Wash. 
Center for Equitable Growth, May 5, 2021), https://equitablegrowth.org/the-consequences-
of-job-displacement-for-u-s-workers/. 
117. See Hiba Hafiz, Structural Labor Rights, 119 MICH. L. REV. 651 (Feb. 2021). 
118. See id.; see also Sanjukta Paul, Antitrust as Allocator of Coordination Rights, 67 UCLA L. REV. 
379 (2020); Ioana Marinescu & Eric Posner, A Proposal to Enhance Antitrust Protection Against Labor 
Market Monopsony, ROOSEVELT INST. (Dec. 21, 2018), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/
publications/a-proposal-to-enhance-antitrust-protection-against-labor-market-monopsony/. 
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employers’ buyer power and bargaining leverage in setting workers’ wages 
and terms and conditions of work.  They thus do not share any information 
about ongoing enforcement actions, investigations, information or data 
collection pertaining to, for example, which workers are more vulnerable to 
work law violations because of their weakened bargaining leverage with 
employers, or which employers’ acquisitions or mergers may have 
strengthened their bargaining power in a labor market in ways that impact 
organizing workers’ demands for union recognition or make workers more 
in need of whistleblower and retaliation protections.119  When antitrust 
agencies enforce against employer monopsony power and unlawful 
agreements to wage-fix, do not poach each other’s workers, or use non-
compete agreements as labor market restraints,120 they are doing so without 
any coordination with the labor agencies.  If a DOJ investigation revealed 
evidence that employers were engaging in wage-fixing, labor agencies lack 
established mechanisms to obtain that evidence to aid in proving that two 
employers are “joint employers” for the purposes of Fair Labor Standards 
Act (FLSA) or NLRA cases.  Evidence of employer buyer power is thus critical 
for labor agencies’ knowledge and analysis of facts on the ground as well as 
their awareness of which employers and which industries suffer from the most 
severe labor market failures.  This is not only key for our post-pandemic 
recovery, but also for strategic enforcement and refining substantive labor and 
antitrust law, for example, by designating employers that wage-fix as “joint 
employers.”121  The lack of any feedback loop between the enforcement efforts 
of the antitrust agencies and the labor agencies means that broader labor 
market enforcement suffers from fragmentary and underlapping coordination 
and could benefit from the best practices discussed in the prior Section. 
Finally, while the MOUs reveal key areas of interagency coordination on 
labor market regulation, they also reveal important areas where agencies have 
failed to build institutions in ways that impact certain industries more than 
others.  For example, information-sharing is often designed to benefit certain 
stakeholders and not others.  The Small Business Act imposes information-
sharing requirements between agencies to ensure that regulatory burdens are 
minimized on small businesses.122  But agencies lack any similar statutory 
obligations to share information, solicit other agencies’ involvement, or consult 
 
119. See, e.g., Hafiz, Structural Labor Rights, supra note 117. 
120. For antitrust agency enforcement in labor markets, see Hiba Hafiz, Labor Antitrust’s 
Paradox, 86 U. CHI. L. REV.  381 passim (2019).  For failures of coordination between labor and 
antitrust agencies in the merger context, see Hiba Hafiz, Interagency Merger Review in Labor 
Markets, 95 CHI. KENT L. REV. 37 (2020). 
121. See, e.g., Hafiz, Structural Labor Rights, supra note 117. 
122. See 5. U.S.C. §§ 601–12. 
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workers or unions on how their regulation affects workers in the labor market.  
III. TOWARDS OUTCOME-BASED INTERAGENCY COORDINATION 
As described above, interagency coordination can play an important role 
in helping agencies effectuate policy goals, and its absence can stymie them.  
This Part takes the lessons learned from studying existing MOUs, and the 
regulatory gaps they reveal, to propose key areas of future, improved 
coordination.  It first identifies and briefly discusses six core policy vectors—
derived from Congress’s stated purposes in passing labor and employment 
statutes as well as scholarly commentary—for benchmarking interagency 
successes and failures in regulating labor markets moving forward.  It then 
leverages the insights gained from studying existing MOUs to offer proposals 
for future interagency coordination on both policymaking and enforcement. 
A. Policy Vectors for Outcome-Based Interagency Coordination  
How an administrative system is organized “affects the substance of 
regulation.”123  Interagency coordination on labor regulation can further the 
policies at the core of our labor and employment laws by, among other things, 
enabling regulatory efficiencies through information-sharing, prioritizing limited 
resources, and ensuring against duplicative efforts.  This Section identifies six 
policy vectors—macroeconomic, microeconomic, institution-building, industry-
specific, anti-subordination, and democratic/expressive policy—as a basis for 
generating proposed areas for additional interagency coordination.  
1) Macroeconomic Policy.  Broader macroeconomic policy goals—economic 
growth, full employment, and equitable distribution—inform Congressional 
legislation, presidential administration, and scholarly commentary on 
optimal labor market regulation and worker protections.  Most explicitly 
through the tax and central banking system, Congress set goals of maximum 
sustainable employment and distributional priorities.124  However, these 
goals also extend to labor and employment legislation.  The Preamble of the 
NLRA states that one of its goals is to equalize workers’ bargaining power 
 
123. Bradley, supra note 9, at 748. 
124. See, e.g., Employment Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1021 (declaring “continuing policy and 
responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means . . . to coordinate and 
utilize all its plans, functions, and resources for the purpose of creating and 
maintaining . . . conditions which promote useful employment opportunities”); Federal Reserve 
Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-188, 91 Stat. 1387 (tasking the Federal Reserve with the goal to 
“promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term 
interest rates”).  For redistributive and regulatory goals of taxation, see, e.g., Reuven Avi-Yonah, 
The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX L. REV. 1, 10–25 (2006) (collecting sources).  
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with employers to avoid “recurrent business depressions, [caused] by 
depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in 
industry.”125  Similarly, the FLSA seeks to eliminate detrimental labor 
conditions to maintain a “minimum standard of living necessary for health, 
efficiency, and general well-being of workers . . . without substantially 
curtailing employment or earning power.”126  Scholars have also highlighted 
the significance of macroeconomic policy-setting beyond monetary and fiscal 
policy, and consideration of the macroeconomic effects of agency action on 
economy-wide prices and employment, including in and through labor 
market regulation.127  Setting macroeconomic policy as a metric for 
evaluating interagency coordination enables consideration, for example, of 
how well agencies use information-sharing and expertise-sharing to 
coherently attack unemployment, redistributive problems, and weak labor 
market institutions that impact employment outcomes.  But it may also 
reveal how agencies’ joint investigation and enforcement impacts labor’s 
share of national income relative to capital.  
2) Microeconomic Policy.  Achieving microeconomic policy goals of 
ensuring efficient wage-setting and reducing market failures like 
information asymmetries, search costs, and other labor market frictions 
are also critical for optimal labor market regulation.128  One purpose of 
the NLRA is to correct for the adverse effects of unequal bargaining 
power between workers and employers that “prevent[] the stabilization 
of competitive wage rates and working conditions within and between 
industries,”129 and presidential policy-setting has also sought to ensure 
workers’ access to competitive labor markets.130  Assessing the 
 
125. 29 U.S.C. § 151; Hiba Hafiz, Economic Analysis of Labor Regulation, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 
1115, 1175–79 (2017). 
126. 29 U.S.C. § 202. 
127. The burgeoning literature on evaluating the distributional consequences of 
regulation is relatively recent. See, e.g., YAIR LISTOKIN, LAW AND MACROECONOMICS (2019); 
Hafiz, Structural Labor Rights, supra note 117Error! Bookmark not defined.; Rory Van Loo, 
Broadening Consumer Law: Competition, Protection, and Distribution, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 211, 
251–60 (2019); Richard Revesz, Regulation and Distribution, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1489 (2018); 
Hafiz, Economic Analysis, supra note 125, at 1152–54, 1176–88. 
128. See generally Hafiz, Economic Analysis, supra note 125, at 1161–64 (providing a 
microeconomic analysis on labor regulations); Suresh Naidu & Eric Posner, Labor Monopsony and the 
Limits of Law (Jan. 13, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3365374.  
129. 29 U.S.C. § 151. 
130. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,725, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,417, 23,417 (Apr. 15, 2016) 
(declaring a policy of “[p]romoting competitive markets and ensuring . . . workers have access 
to the information needed to make informed choices must be a shared priority across the 
Federal Government,” in both “Executive departments and agencies” that  “can contribute 
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microeconomic effects of minimum wages is a staple of minimum wage 
policy and regulation under the FLSA, both as a matter of law and as a 
matter of consistent presidential administration and DOL regulation.131  
Evaluating interagency coordination and its effect on microeconomic 
policy would allow consideration of how well agencies coordinate to 
counter social welfare harms like employer buyer power that suppresses 
wages but also how agencies have worked to counter labor market failures 
that create inefficiencies. 
3) Institution Building.  Building robust labor market institutions—whether 
they be unions or other institutions like hiring halls, workers’ centers, or 
political advocacy organizations that represent workers’ interests—is a core 
goal of the NLRA and has been increasingly identified by scholars as a 
necessary component of stabilizing workers’ countervailing power against 
employers’ unilateral wage-setting.132  Labor market institutions impact the 
distribution of wages, labor’s share of national income, and workers’ broader 
representation in the political process.133  Evaluating how well agencies have 
collectively worked to ensure robust institution-building within labor markets 
 
to these goals through, among other things, pro-competitive rulemaking and regulations, and 
by elimination regulations that create barriers to or limit competition.”). 
131. See generally Michael Reich, Minimum Wage Policy after Seventy-Five Years: Historical and 
Contemporary Effects of the FLSA, U.S. Senate Presentation: Building a Foundation of Fairness 4 (2013), 
https://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Reich1.pdf (summarizing the effects of minimum 
wages on the labor market and employment); David Neumark & William Wascher, Minimum Wages 
and Employment: A Review of Evidence from the New Minimum Wage Research, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. 
RSCH. (2007) (discussing the evolution of minimum wage policy in the United States). 
132. See, e.g., Andrias & Sachs, supra note 5; Benjamin Sachs, the Unbundled Union: Politics 
Without Collective Bargaining, 123 YALE L.J. 148 (2013); Bruce Kaufman, Institutional Economics 
and the Minimum Wage: Broadening the Theoretical and Policy Debate, 63 ILR REV. 427 (2010).  
133. See, e.g., Bruce Kaufman, Institutional Economics and the Minimum Wage, 63 ILR REV. 
427 (2010); see also INT’L LABOUR ORG., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., THE 
LABOUR SHARE IN G20 ECONOMIES 9–10 (2015), https://www.oecd.org/
g20/topics/employment-and-social-policy/The-Labour-Share-in-G20-Economies.pdf; JAKE 
ROSENFELD, WHAT UNIONS NO LONGER DO (2014); RICHARD FREEMAN & JAMES MEDOFF, 
WHAT DO UNIONS DO? (1984); Stanbury & Summers, supra note 4, at 2, 9, 12; Josh Bivens et 
al., It’s Not Just Monopoly and Monopsony: How Market Power Has Affected American Wages 2, 4 (Econ. 
Pol’y Inst. 2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/its-not-just-monopoly-and-monopsony-
how-market-power-has-affected-american-wages/; Tali Kristal, Good Times, Bad Times: Postwar 
Labor’s Share of National Income in Capitalist Democracies, 75 AM. SOC. REV. 729, 730–33 (2010); 
Frank Levy & Peter Temin, Inequality and Institutions in 20th Century America (NBER, Working 
Paper No. 13106 2007), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w13106/w13
106.pdf; Samuel Bentolila & Gilles Saint-Paul, Explaining Movements in the Labor Share, 3 B.E. J. 
OF MACROECONOMICS 1, 14 (2003). 
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can thus be an important window into whether agencies are achieving or 
undermining congressional policy goals in enacting the labor laws, but also 
broader distributional and democratic goals. 
4) Industry-Specific Policy.  While various statutes and Executive policy 
deliberately shape industry-specific formation and growth, those broader 
goals also incentivize and impact skills-development and development in 
human capital that impacts economic growth, unemployment, the effects of 
growing automation on workers’ earning potential, and worker 
displacement.134  Broader labor policy can also impact wage differences 
between industries.135  Thus, evaluating how well agencies collectively work 
to tailor industry-specific policy to support and strengthen not only human 
capital but economic growth is a key metric for evaluating the health of our 
labor markets, priority areas for enforcement, and areas of underlapping 
agency jurisdiction that need remedy. 
5) Anti-Subordination.  Labor market regulation—or lack thereof—
differentially impacts workers based on race, gender, and other protected 
classifications.136  One goal of workplace anti-discrimination law is prohibiting 
practices that “enforce the inferior social status of historically oppressed 
groups” and “allows practices that challenge historical oppression.”137  But 
agencies can either reinforce or work at cross purposes with regard to these 
anti-subordination goals.  But agencies can either reinforce or work at cross 
purposes with regard to these anti-subordination goals.  For example, the 
EEOC may adopt a narrower interpretation of religious exemptions from 
compliance with anti-discrimination laws than the OFCCP under Executive 
Order 11,246.138  It is thus key that analysis of interagency coordination assess 
 
134. See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, What Should We Do After Work? Automation and 
Employment Law, 128 YALE L.J. 254, 272 (2018). 
135. See, e.g., Stanbury & Summers, supra note 4, at 9–19; William Dickens & Lawrence Katz, 
Interindustry Wage Differences and Industry Characteristics 1, 1–2 (NBER, Working Paper No. 2014, 1986). 
136. For recent discussions, see, e.g., Ellora Darenoncourt et al., Why Minimum Wages are a 
Critical Tool for Achieving Racial Justice in the U.S. Labor Market 1, 1–2 (Wash. Ctr. Equitable 
Growth, Oct. 29, 2020), https://equitablegrowth.org/why-minimum-wages-are-a-critical-
tool-for-achieving-racial-justice-in-the-u-s-labor-market/; Elise Gould & Valerie Wilson, 
Black Workers Face Two of the Most Lethal Preexisting Conditions for Coronavirus—Racism and Economic 
Inequality 1, 2 (Econ. Pol’y Inst. June 1, 2020), https://www.epi.org/publication/black-
workers-covid/; Francine Blau & Lawrence Kahn, The Gender Wage Gap: Extent, Trends, and 
Explanations, 55 J. ECON. LIT. 789, 847–48 (2017). 
137. Bradley Areheart, The Anticlassification Turn in Employment Discrimination Law, 63 ALA. L. 
REV. 955, 957 (2012); Reva Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 77, 83 (2000); 
see also Reva Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization, 120 YALE L.J. 1278 (2011); Ruth 
Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986). 
138. See, e.g., John Fox, USDOL Announced a Coming Controversial OFCCP Final Rule 
HAFIZ_ME REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE) 8/18/2021  1:53 PM 
236 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW [6:4 
how agencies are working together to ensure equal opportunity and 
participation, but also to identify areas of improvement based on locating areas 
of underenforcement and needed change. 
6) Democratic and Expressive Policy.  Interagency coordination can also work 
to enhance or frustrate democratic or expressive policy.  Agency policies and 
enforcement can either facilitate or hinder worker organizing, associational 
rights, consolidation of resources, and political power, but they can also 
facilitate or hinder worker expression in and beyond work, whether through 
policies on worker speech, retaliation protections, or allocation of decision-
making power within the firm regarding labor costs or capital investments. 139  
Labor and employment laws have a number of explicit protections for 
workers’ expressive rights,140 but political and expressive rights are also more 
deeply anchored in the First Amendment and the normative and social 
values that inform its doctrinal development.141  Including democratic and 
expressive policy as a metric for evaluating interagency coordination would 
allow assessment of how agencies are strengthening or undermining one 
another to ensure worker participation in private and public life as well as 
identify areas of worker underrepresentation and needed reforms. 
B. Beyond MOUs: Interagency Policymaking and Enforcement Actions 
Interagency coordination is a critical mechanism for effectuating 
centrally-driven Executive policy, incentivizing agency responsiveness to 
Congressional mandates, and establishing metrics for central supervision to 
avoid agency costs and capture.  This is particularly true in labor regulation 
where the number of agencies regulating labor markets are numerous, face 
high coordination costs, and include Executive and independent agencies not 
 
Recognizing Expanded Religious Defenses, JDSUPRA.COM (Dec. 14, 2020). 
139. See, e.g., Andrias & Sachs, supra note 5 at 575, 579, 607 (examining how agency 
administration can strengthen constituency voices and “rebalance[e] political power in the 
direction of political equality” while also collaborating with workers in organizing campaigns); J.S. 
Ahlquist, Labor Unions, Political Representation, and Economic Inequality, 20 ANNUAL REV. POL. SCI. 409 
(2017) (describing unions’ use of political institutions to effectuate worker-friendly policy). 
140. See, e.g., Samuel Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social Equality, 112 MICH. L. REV.  
225, 260–61 & accompanying notes (2013) (collecting anti-retaliation provisions and 
whistleblower protections under labor and employment law); Eugene Volokh, Private 
Employees’ Speech and Political Activity: Statutory Protection Against Employer Retaliation, 16 TEX. REV. 
L. & POL. 295 (2012) (same); see also FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 133, at Ch. 1 (discussing 
union enablement of “collective voice/institutional response face” for workers to state 
concerns and demands rather than exit). 
141. See, e.g., Catherine Fisk, A Progressive Labor Vision of the First Amendment: Past as Prologue, 
118 COLUM. L. REV. 2057, 2079 (2018). 
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subject to the same level of centralized review and scrutiny by OIRA.142  But 
because Congress has not mandated interagency coordination on labor 
regulation by statute, presidential administrations have taken inconsistent 
and limited approaches to interagency coordination through MOUs, and 
MOUs are non-binding instruments subject to the buy-in of political 
appointees and more permanent agency staff, more aggressive measures to 
ensure interagency coordination are required.  This Section thus proposes 
more robust interagency labor regulation through policymaking and 
enforcement that takes advantage of a larger range of formal and informal 
coordination tools available to agencies.  
A first step in establishing a more robust network is identifying the scope 
of interagency coordination beyond merely documenting and 
contextualizing the existence of MOUs on paper. Additional analysis of 
agency documents and interviews on the extent of actual MOU compliance 
is required, as is documentation and analysis of the extent of agency 
consultations pursuant to MOUs, joint agency responsiveness to the 
demands of regulated parties and the broader public, and the scope of 
presidential and congressional administration through policy offices, 
councils, task forces, regulatory review, and oversight mechanisms.143  
Further, while Professor Bijal Shah has exhaustively identified the limited 
scope of interagency adjudications on labor regulation,144 more study is 
necessary to ascertain the extent and nature of interagency joint rulemakings 
as well as comment submissions and more informal consultations in informal 
rulemakings in order to determine the current state of interagency 
involvement in both policy-setting and expertise-sharing in the important 
process of agency rulemakings.  
Following fuller documentation of interagency coordination on labor 
regulation, it is critical to evaluate which of the tools of coordination—
interagency adjudication, interagency rulemaking, and more informal MOU 
use and collaboration—best effectuate both administrative efficiencies and 
achievement of the substantive policy goals along the policy vectors identified 
 
142. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley & Richard Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1284–1292 (2006). 
143. See, e.g., Shah, Congress’s Agency Coordination, supra note 9, at 1980–2000 (documenting 
Congress’s statutory authorization and oversight of interagency coordination); Freeman & 
Rossi, supra note 8, at 1155–81 (examining the range of interagency coordination tools); 
Feinstein, supra note 29, at 1195–1203 (analyzing the sources and limitations of congressional 
oversight of coordination within the administrative state).  
144. See Shah, Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, supra note 9, at Appendix 883–
905 (documenting areas of interagency adjudications on labor regulation by subject area, role, 
governing law, substance of adjudication, and adjudicating agency). 
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above.  In doing so, government actors and scholars should assess the extent to 
which coordination is enhanced through presidential and congressional control 
and oversight, but also through “bottom-up”145 instigators and checks that 
preserve democratic participation and public involvement in agency action.  
Both executive and congressional agencies can assess the extent to which 
agency policy and enforcement priorities are set and successfully fulfilled 
through presidential or congressional coordination, including through OMB, 
OIRA, and the Government Accountability Office (GAO), but also through 
congressional committee, subcommittee, and task force statutory direction and 
oversight.146  Evaluating such coordination can also extend to analysis of 
procedures beyond substance, to whether institutional structures, lines of 
communication, and existing procedures function efficiently, and whether 
agency-collected, legally-shareable labor market information is being 
optimally shared and utilized in agency policy-making, investigation, and 
enforcement.  And agencies like the Administrative Conference of the United 
States can study and evaluate agency-led efforts to engage in joint rulemaking 
and policymaking, where agencies identify areas of overlapping enforcement 
and devise policies for joint enforcement to address identified enforcement 
weaknesses.147  Such assessments can also recommend whether interagency 
coordination may be more robust if mandated by congressional statute, 
presidential mandate or administrative state restructuring, or strengthening 
agency discretion to structure interagency coordination for themselves.148 
Additionally, government actors and scholars should also seek assessments 
of interagency coordination successes from the perspective of workers, from 
the “bottom-up,” to ascertain whether agencies are satisfying their statutory 
mandates and achieving statutory goals along the above-mentioned policy 
vectors.  Workers, worker organizations, and worker advocates are best 
situated to evaluate and suggest priorities for enforcement in particular 
industries and with regard to particularly problematic employers.149  And 
worker-led assessments can evaluate how much interagency coordination 
utilizes innovative institutional design and participatory mechanisms to 
 
145. See Oswalt & Marzán, supra note 6, at 458.  
146. See, e.g., Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1193 (suggesting OMB coordination through 
implementation of the Government Performance and Results Modernization Act of 2010, Pub. 
L. No. 111–352, 124 Stat. 3866, or through reconstituted OIR); see also Andrias, supra note 29, 
at 1103–04; Shah, Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, supra note 9, at 863–64, 871–75.  
147. See ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, IMPROVING COORDINATION OF 
RELATED AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES (2012); Andrias, supra note 29, at 1105. 
148. See, e.g., Shah, Congress’s Agency Coordination, supra note 9, at 1965, 1967–68; see also J.R. 
DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2217, 2261 (2005). 
149. See, e.g., Oswalt & Marzán, supra note 6, at 428–41. 
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enable worker involvement and ensure that, as agencies coordinate, they 
prioritize equitable and inclusive engagement in their joint actions.150  
Worker involvement can also serve as a check on highly politicized control 
and as a flexible, adaptive alternative to the ossification and delay that can 
occur in mandated White House clearance of significant agency action.151 
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A LABOR JUSTICE SYSTEM 
The federal government lacks a coherent, aligned vision on labor market 
regulation and economic mobility through work.  But post-pandemic labor 
regulation will require interagency coordination in order to accomplish its 
critical policy goals.  A deeper understanding of the regulatory footprint—its 
breadth and scope—as well as the functional limitations of agency 
cooperation requires further research and investigation, not only to 
determine how interagency cooperation impacts macroeconomic growth 
and inequality, but also to ensure that the convergence of factors that have 
increased permanent unemployment risk through “reallocation shock” and 
low-quality, low-paying jobs are not further entrenched.  Assessing the 
general level of labor policy fragmentation and which forms of collaboration 
better effectuate which policy outcomes and ensure ideal collaborative 
practices will play an important role in facilitating regulation that will 
maximize workers’ access to economic opportunity and mobility. 
  
 
150. For inclusive participation in the administrative state, see, e.g., K. SABEEL RAHMAN 
& HOLLIE GILMAN, CIVIC POWER: REBUILDING AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN AN ERA OF CRISIS 
(2019); K. Sabeel Rahman, Rethinking Regulation at 3 (Roosevelt Inst. Apr. 19, 2016), 
https://rooseveltinstitute.org/publications/rethinking-regulation/; see also Yale Journal on 
Regulation’s Symposium on Racism in Administrative Law, https://www.yalejreg.com
/topic/racism-in-administrative-law-symposium/.  
151. On ossification and delay resulting from centralized review, see, e.g., Sidney Shapiro 
& Ronald Wright, The Future of the Administrative Presidency, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV.  577, 609 
(2011); Bagley & Revesz, supra note 142, at 1268; Paul Verkuil, Rulemaking Ossification—A 
Modest Proposal, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 453, 453-59 (1995). 
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APPENDIX A: HAND-CODED INTERAGENCY MEMORANDA OF 
UNDERSTANDING 
Number of Agreements: 113  
 
Federal Agency # of 
MOUs 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), 
Department of Labor 
58 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 16 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) 13 
Office of Federal Contract Compliance and Programs 
(OFCCP), Department of Labor 
12 
Mining Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), 
Department of Labor 
9 
Wage and Hour Division (WHD), Department of Labor 9 
Employment and Training Administration (ETA), 
Department of Labor 
7 
Employment Standards Administration (ESA), Department 
of Labor 
6 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Department of Labor 2 
Department of Labor (DOL) 2 
 
CODES:  
AH (ad hoc/event-limited) 
C (consultation duties/obligations) 
CI (coordinating investigations) 
CE (coordinating enforcement) 
CR (conflict resolution) 
CT/P (cross-training or interchange of agency personnel) 
E&O (education and outreach) 
IAC (interagency compensation of resources) 
IB (institution building—office, liaison position, etc.) 
IAR (interagency compliance reviews) 
ICR (internal compliance reviews) 
IS (information sharing) 
J (jurisdiction clarification) 
JP (joint policy-making) 
JR (joint research) 
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PLC (permanent lines of communication between designated officials) 
PRC (personnel and resources commitment) 
PM (procedural mechanisms) 
R (referral authority) 
RR (reporting requirements) 
SMC (statutorily-mandated collaboration) 
TC (termination conditions) 
Nixon Administration 
1970:  
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR OFFICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE AND THE 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION CONCERNING 
THE PROCESSING OF COMPLAINTS OF EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION AS BETWEEN THE TWO AGENCIES – R, C, RR, IS, 
PM, CE 
1971:  
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION AND THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (May 14, 
1971) – IS, PM, JP 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE MINING ENFORCEMENT 
AND SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, AND THE 
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, AND FIREARMS DIVISION (ATF), 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (June 1, 1971) – J, PM 
1973: 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 
AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, AND THE 
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS (NBS), DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
(Oct. 9, 1973) – JR, IB, PLC, PM 
1974:  
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR OFFICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE AND THE 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION – R, C, RR, IS, PM, 
CE 
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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)-OSHA AGREEMENT (Feb. 4, 1974) – J  
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND 
WELFARE AND THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 
ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (Apr. 10, 1974) – C, JP, RR, 
IS, IAR, CE, IB, PLC, TC 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 
AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND THE 
CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION (CPSC) (Apr. 11, 1974) – J, 
IB, PLC, JP, C, IS, E&O, TC 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 
AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND THE 
EXTENSION SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (Apr. 15, 
1974) – J , CE, CT/P, IS, IB, E&O, IAR, TC 
 
RESPECTIVE AUTHORITIES OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 
ADMINISTRATION (OSHA) AND THE BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, 
AND FIREARMS (ATF) CONCERNING EMPLOYEE SAFETY AND HEALTH IN 
EXPLOSIVES STORAGE AREA (Aug. 8, 1974) – J, PM 
Ford Administration 
1975: 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN EMPLOYMENT AND 
TRAINING ADMINISTRATION (ETA) AND EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS 
ADMINISTRATION (ESA) REGARDING STRANDED MIGRANTS (March 1975) 
– PM  
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND 
HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, AND THE 
GENERAL COUNSEL, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (June 24, 
1975) – J, PM, CE, RR, C 
Carter Administration 
1978:  
AGREEMENT BETWEEN OSHA AND EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS 
ADMINISTRATION (ESA) FOR MIGRANT AND SEASONAL FARMWORKER 
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HOUSING INSPECTIONS (Apr. 19, 1978) – J, CE, PM, R, IB, PLC, CT/P, IS 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS BOARD (Oct. 26, 1978) [not available] 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING ARMY GOCO 
AMMUNITION PLANTS BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND THE 
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY ACTING FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE (Nov. 6, 1978) – J, PM, CR, CI, TC 
1979:  
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND 
HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, AND THE 
GENERAL COUNSEL, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (Jan. 17, 1979) 
– J, R 
 
INTERAGENCY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH 
ADMINISTRATION (MSHA), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, AND THE 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (Mar. 29, 1979) – J, PM, IB, CR, R, IS, PLC, JP, 
CT/P, TC 
 
INTERIM MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR AND THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (Dec. 7, 1979) – 
IS, PM, ICR 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES COAST 
GUARD, THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND THE 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, THE 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, CONCERNING OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND 
HEALTH ON ARTIFICIAL ISLANDS, INSTALLATIONS, AND OTHER DEVICES 
ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF ON THE UNITED STATES (Dec. 19, 
1979) – JP, PM, IS, JR, IAR, CT/P, C, CE, CI, R 
 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 
ADMINISTRATION (OSHA), THE EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS 
ADMINISTRATION (ESA), AND THE EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING 
ADMINISTRATION (ETA) FOR INSPECTIONS OF MIGRANT AGRICULTURAL 
WORKER HOUSING (1979) – J, IS, CE, R, RR 
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1980:  
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH 
ADMINISTRATION (MSHA), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, AND THE 
GENERAL COUNSEL, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (NLRB) (Feb. 
19, 1980) – J, C, PM, CE, RR, TC 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE MINE SAFETY AND 
HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (MSHA), DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, AND THE 
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS, AND EXPLOSIVES (ATF), 
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY (Apr. 9, 1980) – J, PLC, C, JP, CE, IS 
 
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT REGARDING RESOLUTION OF SMALL 
BUSINESS PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND 
HEALTH ADMINISTRATION AND THE SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 
(Apr. 10, 1980) – PLC, CE 
 
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT REGARDING FLEXIBILITY IN RULEMAKING 
BETWEEN THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 
AND THE SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION (Apr. 10, 1980) – C, IS, JP, 
PLC, E&O, RR 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION AND THE GENERAL COUNSEL, NATIONAL 
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (June 24, 1980) [not available] 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AMONG THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE 
FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 
AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD 
AND THE UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY – 
GUIDANCE FOR WORKER PROTECTION DURING HAZARDOUS WASTE 
SITE INVESTIGATIONS CLEANUP AND HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE 
EMERGENCIES (Dec. 18, 1980) – PLC, IB, JP, PM, CT/P, TC, IAR, JR 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE OFFICE OF PESTICIDES 
AND TOXIC SUBSTANCES, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 
AND THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR FOR GENERAL COOPERATION, SHARING OF 
CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION, OSHA-EPA COOPERATION IN 
THE TSCA PREMANUFACTURE NOTIFICATION PROGRAM, AND 
TRANSFER OF EPA INFORMATION ON SUBSTANCE RISK NOTICES (Jan. 19, 
1981) – IB, PLC, IS, R, JP, J, E&O, CT/P, ICR, C, RR, TC 
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Reagan Administration 
1981:  
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR OFFICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE AND THE EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION – R, C, RR, IS, PM, CE 
1982:  
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 
(OSHA) AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FOOD AND 
INSPECTION SERVICE (FSIS) (May 20, 1982) – PLC, C, IS, E&O, RR, JP, J, 
TC 
1983:  
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES COAST 
GUARD, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, AND THE 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, CONCERNING THEIR AUTHORITY TO 
PRESCRIBE AND ENFORCE STANDARDS OR REGULATIONS AFFECTING 
THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH OF SEAMEN ABOARD VESSELS 
INSPECTED AND CERTIFIED BY THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD (Mar. 
4, 1983) – J, R 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 
AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, AND THE 
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS (NBS), DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
(Oct. 27, 1983) – JR, IB, PLC, PM 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GENERAL SERVICES 
ADMINISTRATION (GSA) AND THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 
ADMINISTRATION (OSHA) (Nov. 4, 1983) – IS, PM, IAR 
1984: 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 
ADMINISTRATION (OSHA), THE EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS 
ADMINISTRATION (ESA), AND THE EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING 
ADMINISTRATION (ETA) FOR INSPECTIONS OF MIGRANT AGRICULTURAL 
WORKER HOUSING (Jan. 31, 1984) – J, IS, CE, R, RR 
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1985: 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND 
HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, AND THE 
GENERAL COUNSEL, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (Feb. 11, 
1985) [not available] 
1986:  
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AMONG THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE 
FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 
AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD 
AND THE UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY – 
GUIDANCE FOR WORKER PROTECTION DURING HAZARDOUS WASTE 
SITE INVESTIGATIONS CLEANUP AND HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE 
EMERGENCIES – SUB-AGREEMENT FOR COORDINATING RESEARCH, 
DEVELOPMENT, TESTING, AND EVALUATION OF CHEMICAL PROTECTIVE 
CLOTHING, EQUIPMENT, PROCEDURES, AND INFORMATION AMONG 
FEDERAL AGENCIES (Jan. 7, 1986) – PM, IS, JR, IAR, C, CE, CI, R 
 
ENV’T PROT. AGENCY & THE DEP’T OF LAB., MEMORANDUM OF 
UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
AGENCY (EPA) AND THE DEP’T OF LAB. (Feb. 6, 1986) – IS, RR, PLC, C, 
PM, JP 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE FCC AND EEOC (1986) 
– IS, CE, R, C, PM, C, JP, PLC, TC 
1987: 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE MINE SAFETY AND 
HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (MSHA) AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
ENERGY (DOE) (1987) – CI, RR 
1988: 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. OFFICE OF SPECIAL 
COUNSEL AND EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (Feb. 
1998) – J, R, IS, RR, CI, PLC, PM 
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Bush I Administration 
1989:  
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL FOR 
IMMIGRATION RELATED UNFAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES (1989) – IS, 
PM, PLC, R 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND 
HEALTH (NIOSH), AND THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL 
SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (Dec. 26, 1989) – IS, PLC, IB, TC 
1990:  
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION AND 
EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, WAGE AND HOUR 
DIVISION (Apr. 5, 1990) – R, IS, CE, CT/P, PM, IAR, TC 
 
INTERAGENCY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
THE NAVY AND THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR - OSHA 
(July 11, 1990) –  IB, CT/P, CR, TC 
 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., DEP’T OF LAB. & OFF. OF ENF’T, 
U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
BETWEEN THE U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH 
ADMIN. & THE U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY OFF.OF ENFORCEMENT (Nov. 
23, 1990) – J, PM, IS, R, CT/P, JP, IB, PLC, CR, CI, CE, IAR, TC 
1991:  
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., DEP’T OF LAB. & OFF. OF ENF’T, 
U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
BETWEEN THE U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 
ADMIN. & THE U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY OFF. OF ENFORCEMENT (Feb. 
13, 1991) – CT/P, IS, JP, CI, CE, R, IB, PLC, IAR, IB, TC 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE CENSUS BUREAU AND 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (April 1991) – IS, PM 
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1992:  
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE CENSUS BUREAU AND 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (April 1992) – IS, PM 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (Aug. 28, 1992) – J, PM, 
IAC, CT/P, IS, IAR, C, R, PLC, IB, TC 
Clinton Administration 
1993: 
FED. TRADE COMM’N  & ANTITRUST DIV. OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE FED. TRADE 
COMM’N AND THE ANTITRUST DIV. OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 
CONCERNING CLEARANCE PROCEDURES FOR INVESTIGATIONS (1993) 
[not labor market-related] 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF 
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD AND THE EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (Nov. 16, 1993) – C, PM, 
PLC, IS, CE, R  
1994:  
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION AND 
THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD AND INSPECTION 
SERVICE (Feb. 4, 1994) – J, JP, CT/P, PM, R, IS, IAR, PLC, TC 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION AND 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTS, SAFETY AND 
HEALTH (Dec. 21, 1994) – J, PM, R, CI, C, IS, CT/P, CR, PLC, TC 
1995:  
FED. TRADE COMM’N  & ANTITRUST DIV. OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE FED. TRADE 
COMM’N AND THE ANTITRUST DIV. OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 
CONCERNING CLEARANCE PROCEDURES FOR INVESTIGATIONS (1995) 
[not labor market-related] 
 
HAFIZ_ME REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE) 8/18/2021  1:53 PM 
2021] INTERAGENCY COORDINATION ON LABOR REGULATION 249 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (June 19, 1995) – J, PLC, 
IAC, IB, TC 
1996:  
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE ANTITRUST DIVISION 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE IMMIGRATION AND 
NATURALIZATION SERVICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
(Mar. 15, 1996) – CE  
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY 
COMMISSION AND THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 
ADMINISTRATION WITH RESPECT TO THE GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANTS 
(Aug. 1, 1996) – J, SMC, CR, IS, E&O, R, PM, CT/P, PLC, C, CE, TC 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE 
ASSURANCE AND THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF OCCUPATIONAL 
SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION ON CHEMICAL ACCIDENT 
INVESTIGATION (Dec. 1, 1996) – J, PM, RR, IS, CI, CE, PLC, CR, CT/P, 
TC 
1997: 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL FOR 
IMMIGRATION RELATED UNFAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES (Dec. 18, 
1997) – IS, PM, PLC, R 
1998:  
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
AND THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION COOPERATION 
REGARDING EMPLOYEE PROTECTION MATTERS (Sept. 9, 1998) – RR, R, 
IS, CE, PLC, TC 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 
ADMINISTRATION AND THE UNITED STATES CHEMICAL SAFETY AND 
HAZARD INVESTIGATION BOARD ON CHEMICAL INCIDENT 
INVESTIGATION (Sept. 24, 1998) – PM, RR, PLC, CR, CT/P, E&O, IAC, 
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TC 
1999:  
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION AND THE EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (Apr. 7, 1999) – IS, CT/P, R, 
PM 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR OFFICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE AND THE EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (1999) – R, C, RR, IS, PM, CE 
 
ANTITRUST DIV. OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FED. TRADE COMM’N, & DEP’T 
OF AGRIC., MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE 
ANTITRUST DIV., DEP’T OF JUST., THE FED. TRADE COMM’N, AND THE 
DEP’T OF AGRIC. RELATIVE TO COOPERATION WITH RESPECT TO 
MONITORING COMPETITIVE CONDITIONS IN THE AGRICULTURAL 
MARKETPLACE (Aug. 31, 1999) – CE, PLC, TC, IS  
2000:  
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION AND 
THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY 
AND HEALTH ON SAFETY AND HEALTH ENFORCEMENT AT PRIVATE 
FACILITIES AND OPERATIONS (July 25, 2000) – J, PM, JP, CR, TC 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE FEDERAL AVIATION 
ADMINISTRATION U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND THE 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (Aug. 9, 2000) – J, CR, PM, JP, C 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR AND U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION ON MEGA 
CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS (Aug. 28, 2000) – J, IS, PM, E&O, CE, IAR, 
IB, PLC, CT/P, CR, PM, TC 
Bush II Administration 
2002: 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE FEDERAL TRADE 
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COMMISSION AND THE ANTITRUST DIVISION OF THE UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CONCERNING CLEARANCE PROCEDURES FOR 
INVESTIGATIONS (Mar. 2, 2002) – J, CE, JP, IS, RR, PLC, PM, CR, IB  
 
FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., & OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 
& HEALTH ADMIN., MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE 
FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., AND OCCUPATIONAL 
SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN. CONCERNING THE PROTECTION OF 
EMPLOYEES WHO PROVIDE AIR SAFETY INFORMATION (Mar. 22, 2002), 
67 Fed. Reg. 55,883 (Aug. 30, 2002). – CE, PLC, JP, IS, TC 
2003:  
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE FEDERAL 
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND THE FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION REGARDING TELEMARKETING ENFORCEMENT (Dec. 2003) 
[not labor market-related] 
Obama Administration 
2010:  
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., DEP’T OF LAB. & FED. ON SCENE 
COORDINATOR, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., MEMORANDUM OF 
UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 
ADMIN., DEP’T OF LAB. & THE FED. ON SCENE COORDINATOR, DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC. CONCERNING OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 
ISSUES RELATED TO THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL RESPONSE 
(June 10, 2010) – J, AH, IS, R, CE, RR, E&O, TC, PLC 
 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, FED. DRUG ADMIN. & 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., DEP’T OF LAB., JOINT 
STATEMENT BETWEEN OSHA AND THE FDA, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVICES (Sept. 16, 2010) – IS, PLC, PM 
2011:  
U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. & U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, MEMORANDUM OF 
UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. AND THE U.S. . 
DEP’T OF ENERGY (Jan. 21, 2011) – J, CE, PM, IS, PLC 
 
REVISED MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENTS 
OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND LABOR CONCERNING ENFORCEMENT 
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ACTIVITIES AT WORKSITES (Mar. 31, 2011) – J, IS, PM, CE, CI, IB, PLC, 
TC 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE COMMODITY FUTURES 
TRADING COMMISSION (CFTC) AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
(FTC) REGARDING INFORMATION SHARING IN AREAS OF COMMON 
REGULATORY INTEREST (Apr. 2011) [not labor market-related] 
 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., DEP’T OF LAB. & DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MEMORANDUM 
OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND 
HEALTH ADMIN., DEP’T OF LAB. & THE FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES SHARING HEALTH AND SAFETY 
INFORMATION RELATED TO FACILITIES WHERE FOOD IS PRODUCED, 
PROCESSED AND HELD (June 20, 2011) – IS, PM, CT/P, PLC, TC 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERVICE AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (Sept. 19, 2011) – IS, 
PLC, CE, IB, E&O, R, PM, IB, TC 
 
U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. & EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, MEMORANDUM 
OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. AND EQUAL EMP. 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Nov. 7, 2011), 76 Fed. Reg. 71,029, 71,030 (Nov. 
7, 2011) – J, IB, PLC, PM, R, IS, C, IAR, CE, CI, CT/P, JP 
 
REVISED MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENTS 
OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND LABOR CONCERNING ENFORCEMENT 
ACTIVITIES AT WORKSITES (Dec. 7, 2011) – J, IS, PM, CE, CI, IB, PLC, 
TC 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 
AND THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF 
LAND MANAGEMENT (Dec. 27, 2011) – J, CE, IS, RR, PLC, CR, TC 
2012:  
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR (EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMINISTRATION) AND THE U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (OFFICE OF NATIONAL 
COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND 
HEALTH RESOURCES AND SERVICES ADMINISTRATION) (Feb. 9, 2012-
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Feb. 28, 2015) – IB, PLC, E&O, IS, CE, TC, IAR, CR 
2013:  
U.S DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND U.S. GENERAL SERVICES 
ADMINISTRATION MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON MEGA 
CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS (July 9, 2013) – J, IS, PM, E&O, CE, IAR, IB, 
PLC, CT/P, CR, PM, TC 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE NATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS BOARD AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS 
DIVISION OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL FOR IMMIGRATION-RELATED 
UNFAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES (July 9, 2013) – J, IS, R, CI 
 
U.S. NUCLEAR REGUL. COMM’N & OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH 
ADMIN., DEP’T OF LAB., MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN 
THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGUL. COMM’N & THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & 
HEALTH ADMIN. (Sept. 6, 2013) – J, R, RR, CI, IS, CT/P, PLC, TC 
2014:  
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN U.S. OFFICE OF SPECIAL 
COUNSEL AND EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (Jan. 
14, 2014) – J, R, IS, RR, CI, PLC, PM 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND 
HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (OSHA) AND GENERAL COUNSEL OF 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (NLRB) (MEMORANDUM 14-60) 
(Mar. 6, 2014) – CE, PLC, CT/P, R, RR 
 
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE FEDERAL RAILROAD 
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, AND THE 
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR (Apr. 17, 2014). – SMC, J, CT/P, R, RR, IS, CI, C, CR, PLC, JP, 
TC 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND 
HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, AND THE 
GENERAL COUNSEL, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD REGARDING 
OSHA REFERRED CHARGES (OM 14-60) (May 21, 2014) – J, SMC, CE, 
IAR, R, RR, CT/P, PLC, TC 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE FEDERAL AVIATION 
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ADMINISTRATION U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND THE 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR CONCERNING OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND 
HEALTH STANDARDS FOR AIRCRAFT CABIN CREWMEMBERS (Aug. 26, 
2014). – CE, PLC, JP, IS, TC 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU) BETWEEN THE U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE) AND THE MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH 
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (Oct. 7, 2014). – J, CE, 
PM, IS, PLC 
2015:  
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT 
OF JUSTICE – CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION REGARDING ADA AND GINA 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CHARGES AGAINST STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS (July 23, 2015) – J, CE, PM, E&O, JP, CT/P 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY AND THE DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION U.S. MARITIME ADMINISTRATION AND THE 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 
ADMINISTRATION AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 
OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE ON 
COORDINATION AND INFORMATION SHARING OF DOMESTIC SHIP 
RECYCLING OPERATIONS (July 30, 2015) – RR, PM, CI, IS, PLC, TC 
 
FCC-FTC CONSUMER PROTECTION MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
(November 2015) [not labor market-related] 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE FEDERAL AVIATION 
ADMINISTRATION U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND THE 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR CONCERNING THE WENDELL H. FORD 
AVIATION INVESTMENT AND REFORM ACT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 
COORDINATION (Dec. 1, 2015) – IS, RR, IAR, CT/P, PLC, TC 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. DEPARTMENTS OF 
LABOR AND JUSTICE ON CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS OF WORKER SAFETY 
LAWS (Dec. 17, 2015) – IS, CT/P, R, IB, PLC, PM, TC 
HAFIZ_ME REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE) 8/18/2021  1:53 PM 
2021] INTERAGENCY COORDINATION ON LABOR REGULATION 255 
2016:  
ADDENDUM TO THE REVISED MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENTS OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND LABOR 
CONCERNING ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES AT WORKSITES (May 16, 
2016) – J, IS, PM, CE, CI, IB, PLC, TC 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND 
EXPLOSIVES AND THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR MINE SAFETY AND 
HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (June 30, 2016). – PLC, C, RR, JP, CE, 
CT/P, IS, PM, CI, TC 
 
U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., WAGE & HOUR DIV. & THE NAT’L LAB. RELATIONS 
BD., MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. DEP’T 
OF LAB., WAGE & HOUR DIV., AND THE NAT’L LAB. RELATIONS BD. 
(Dec. 14, 2016) – CI, CE, IS, PM, CT/P, E&O, PLC, C, RR, TC  
2017:  
U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., WAGE & HOUR DIV. & EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. 
DEP’T OF LAB., WAGE & HOUR DIV. AND THE U.S. EQUAL EMP. 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Jan. 6, 2017) —IS, CI, CE, CT/P, E&O, PM, 
JP 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE FEDERAL MOTOR 
CARRIER SAFETY ADMINISTRATION U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION AND THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 
ADMINISTRATION U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (Apr. 14, 2017) – R, 
IS, PLC, CT/P, IAR, CR, TC 
 
INTER-AGENCY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR (DOL), OFFICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE 
PROGRAMS (OFCCP) AND THE U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (USCB) TO 
PROVIDE GOODS AND SERVICES RELATED TO THE EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY CUSTOM TABULATION (EEO CUSTOM 
TABULATION OR EEO TAB) USING THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 
SURVEY (ACS) 5-YEAR DATA FOR YEARS 2014-2018 (June 19, 2017) – 
IS, IAC, PM, IAR, IB, PLC, C, RR, CT/P, TC, CR 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE WAGE AND HOUR 
DIVISION AND THE EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMINISTRATION  
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OFFICE OF FOREIGN LABOR CERTIFICATION REGARDING 
EMPLOYMENT-BASED LABOR CERTIFICATION AND LABOR 
CONDITION APPLICATION DATA (Sept. 29, 2017) – IS, PM, CT/P, 
PLC, TC, CR 
 
RESTORING INTERNET FREEDOM FCC-FTC MEMORANDUM OF 
UNDERSTANDING (Dec. 14, 2017) [not labor market-related] 
2018:  
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION IMMIGRANT AND EMPLOYEE 
RIGHTS SECTION AND THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR EMPLOYMENT 
AND TRAINING ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF FOREIGN LABOR 
CERTIFICATION REGARDING INFORMATION SHARING AND CASE 
REFERRAL (July 31, 2018) – R, IS, CE, CT/P, PM, IB, PLC, CI, PRC, 
J, TC, CR 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION AND THE DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS (Nov. 
29, 2018) [not labor market-related] 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION AND THE U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE – CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION (CRT) 
REGARDING TITLE VII EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CHARGES 
AGAINST STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (Dec. 21, 2018) – R, CE, 
IS, RR, C, PLC, PM, CT/P, JP, TC  
2019:  
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE CONSUMER 
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU AND THE FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION (Feb. 25, 2019) [not labor market-related] 
2020: 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AMONG THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR, THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Nov. 3, 2020) – IS, PM, C, 
CE, CI, PLC, IB, R, TC 
 
